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ABSTRACT
The standard revealed-preference estimate of a city's quality of life is proportional to that city's cost-of-living
relative to its wage-level. Adjusting estimates to account for federal taxes, non-housing costs, and
non-labor income produces more plausible quality-of-life estimates than in the previous literature.
Unlike previous estimates, adjusted quality-of-life measures successfully predict how housing costs
rise with wage levels, are positively correlated with popular "livability" rankings and stated preferences,
and do not decrease with city size. Mild seasons, sunshine, hills, and coastal proximity account for
most inter-metropolitan quality-of-life differences. Amendments to quality-of-life measures for labor-market
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The urban wage premium that cities offer is seen by economists as evidence not only of high urban
productivity, but also as compensation for urban disamenities, such as crime, congestion, and
pollution (Hoch 1972). This view feeds the stereotype that urban life is an unfortunate by-product
of civilization, and leads Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) to discount economic growth measures for
increasing urbanization when they attempt to measure changes in economic welfare over time.
This view is also used to endorse policies to depopulate cities and subsidize rural areas for greater
"population balance," as in the National Science Foundation report by Elgin et al. (1974). Yet,
interest in urban quality of life persists, as seen recently in the theme of the 2010 World Expo in
Shanghai, "Better City, Better Life," which according to the organizers represents "the common
wish of humankind for a better living in future urban environments."
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) point out that high nominal wage levels may compensate for
higher rents, as well as for disamenities. Overall, the value of a city’s amenities, captured in its
overall quality of life (QOL), is reflecte in how high its cost-of-living is relative to its wage level,
i.e. the inverse of its real wage. Workers will live in a place where real wages are low if their lower
consumption of market goods is offset by a higher consumption of non-market amenities. Using
hedonic methods, these QOL measures are used to determine households’ willingness-to-pay for
amenities such as climate, safety, and clean air.1
Despite its solid foundations on revealed-preference theory, the QOL indices found in the eco-
nomic literature (e.g. Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn 1988; Gyourko and Tracy 1989) often seem
counterintuitive or "misplaced"(Rappaport 2008). Ranking the QOL of states in 1990, Gabriel,
Mattey, and Wascher (2003) put Wyoming, South Dakota, and Arkansas first second, and third,
while putting seemingly more desirable Colorado, Hawaii and California in 34th, 35th, and 42nd.
Ranking 185 metropolitan areas in the United States, Berger, Blomquist and Waldner (1987) rank
Pueblo, CO, Macon, GA, and Reno, NV in the top three, while San Francisco, CA, is 105th; Seat-
tle, WA, 144th; and New York, NY, 165th. These city rankings are correlated negatively with city
1Gyourko, Kahn, and Tracy (1999) and Lambiri, Biagi, and Royeula (2007) are excellent guides to this literature.
1size (Burnell and Galster 1992) and with QOL rankings found in popular guides, such as the Places
Rated Almanac (Savageau 1999), where many large cities score favorably in overall "livability."2
I argue here that the Rosen-Roback model produces more sensible QOL and amenity-value
estimates once three adjustments are made. First, cost-of-living measures should incorporate cost
differences beyond housing costs. Second, proper accounting must account for how urban wage
levels affect a typical household’s buying power. Third, wage differences should net out federal
taxes. Across metropolitan areas – equated here with "cities" – the adjusted model successfully
predicts that a one-percent increase in wages is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in housing
costs, holding amenities constant, unlike previous studies, which predict a 3 to 4 percent increase.3
Estimates from the adjusted model, based on 2000 data, imply that real incomes in large cities
are lower, and QOL higher, than previously thought. The two nicest cities in the United States are
Honolulu and Santa Barbara, while San Francisco, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York
are all above the national average; the top fve states are Hawaii, California, Vermont, Colorado,
and Oregon. These adjusted QOL rankings are positively correlated with rankings in Places Rated
and rankings based on stated preferences. Adjusted amenity-value estimates indicate that house-
holds have a substantial willingness-to-pay to live in areas with coasts, slopes, sunshine, warm
winters, and mild summers: a parsimonious model using only these fve variables explains over 70
percent of the variation in QOL across cities. Valuations of artificia amenities are more tenuous,
revealing a substantial willingness-to-pay to live in areas with arts and culture, bars and restau-
rants, and cleaner air. They fail to show positive valuations for safety from crime, an amenity that
is geographically concentrated within metropolitan areas. Unadjusted hedonic estimates often pro-
duce counterintuitive valuations, findin mild summers, coastal proximity, and arts and culture to
2These differences persist when measured at the county level in Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) where sub-
urban Marin County is ranked 142nd (out of 253 counties), even lower than the City and County of San Francisco,
ranked 105th. Burnell and Galster (1992) note that, in Places Rated, QOL peaks at a city size of 4 million. Oppositely,
Clark, Kahn, and Ofek (1992) fin that QOL reaches a minimum at 4 million with a measures based on nominal, not
real, wages, arguing this is correct in a monocentric city model with free mobility, where – paradoxically – cities are of
fi ed size. Hoehn, Berger, and Blomquist (1987), allow city size to be endogenous in a system of monocentric cities,
and re-establish the need to use real wages.
3The Appendix demonstrates that a log-linear specificatio of QOL fit the data better than a linear specification
and that a QOL model based on a second-order log-linearization, which incorporates tax progressivity and income and
expenditures change, does little to change the estimates.
2be undesirable. Overall, larger cities tend to be located in areas with greater natural amenities, but
once these are controlled for, there is no relationship between city size and QOL, implying that on
average big cities are no worse to live in than small ones. It even appears that QOL may be higher
in denser cities.
The last section of the paper considers amendments of the model to handle household het-
erogeneity in skills and preferences, as well as moving and adaptation costs. This section sheds
light on structural discrete-choice models of household location and migration across metropolitan
areas used to produce amenity valuations (e.g. Timmins 2007, Bishop 2008, Sinha and Cropper
2009). Economic reasoning suggests that larger or growing areas are more desirable to inframar-
ginal residents than is estimated by QOL measures based on wages and costs alone. Dynamic
considerations of local adaptation suggest that population growth, rather than level, is more useful
for amending QOL measures. Thus, faster growing cities and their amenities – sunshine, slopes,
warm weather, and clean air – may be even more desirable than the initial estimates presented. The
marginal value of coastal proximity, an amenity very fi ed in supply, appears to be increasingly
different from the average value. Lastly, as a consequence of Zipf’s and Gibrat’s laws for cities –
which imply that population levels and growth rates are uniformly distributed across city sizes –
neither population-level or growth amendments suggest a preference bias towards either smaller or
larger cities.
Heterogeneous tastes across different household types for cities and amenities have gener-
ally been addressed by examining wage differences (e.g. Roback 1988; Beeson 1991; Black,
Kolesnikova, and Taylor 2009; and Lee 2010). When applied to heterogenous households, the
adjusted model successfully predicts that less-educated households are paid higher premia in more
expensive and lower-wage areas. Relative QOL valuations appear problematic as they ignore the
influenc of labor demand factors on wages, which imply that higher concentrations of a house-
hold type signal stronger tastes in addition to lower wages. This amendment produces more plau-
sible measures of relative QOL values and reveals that more educated households appear to have
3stronger tastes for culture, entertainment, and clean air, and care less about crime.4
2 Basic Theory and Calibration
Assume that worker-households, whose types are indexed by g, are fully mobile across cities,
indexed by j. Preferences are modeled by the utility function Ug(y;Qj
g), which is increasing and
quasi-concaveoveravectorofmarketgoods, y, andqualityoflife, Qj
g, modeledbyascalarspecifi
to city and type. Local prices of y are given by the vector pj. Qj
g cannot be purchased directly and
depends on city amenities, Zj, according to the function Qj = e Q(Zj). Households supply a single
unit of labor in their city of residence and earn a wage, wj
g, and also receive non-labor income, Ig,
which does not depend on the city of residence.5 Out of gross income, mj
g = wj
g + Ig, households
pay a federal tax, ￿(wj
g + Ig).6
The after-tax net expenditure necessary to obtain utility ug, given local prices, wages, and QOL
is written as Eg(pj;wj
g;￿;ug;Qj
g) ￿ minyfpj ￿y￿wj
g ￿Ig +￿(wj
g +Ig) : Ug(y;Qj
g) ￿ ugg Since
households are fully mobile, each type’s utility, ug, must be equalized across the cities it inhabits.






g) = 0 , (1)
where ￿ ug is the obtained utility. Totally differentiating (1) around national averages of ￿ p; ￿ wg and
￿ Qg produces @Eg=@pj￿dp
j+@E=@w￿dwj
g+@Eg=@Q￿dQj
g = 0. Applying Shepard’s Lemma and







g = pQg ￿ dQj
g where ￿0
g is the marginal tax rate
4The methods here meant to complement quasi-experimental estimates of amenity values (e.g. Black 1999, Chay
and Greenstone 2005), and structural migration models with household heterogeneity (e.g. Kennan and Walker 2003),
which all require that that population stocks or fl ws be weighted correctly together with wages and housing costs.
5Roback (1980) models elastic labor supply, and find it has no first-orde effects on QOL estimates.
6Deductions for local public goods and housing are left out here, but are included in the application and discussed
in full in Albouy (2009a), which also explains how federal expenditures are not correlated with federal taxes, and
most federal public goods, mainly defense, benefi areas fairly equally. Therefore, differences in disposable income
across areas should be measured after federal taxes. The local public sector does not need explicitly modeling: Local
government goods may be treated as consumption goods, part traded and part non-traded, and differences in local
government efficien y may be reflecte in Q (Gyourko and Tracy 1989).
4and pQg ￿ ￿@Eg=@Q is the marginal willingness-to-pay for QOL. Log-linearizing this formula,
so that ^ wj
g ￿ dwj



















where syg is a vector of expenditure shares, out of gross income, and swg ￿ ￿ wg=￿ mg is the share
of gross income received from labor. In percentage terms, syg ￿ b pj represents how high the cost-
of-living is in city j relative to the national average, while swg ^ wj
g represents how high nominal
income is, with the (1￿￿0
g) netting out federal taxes. Thus, (2) equates local QOL with how much
cost-of-living exceeds nominal income levels, or how low after-tax real incomes are relative to the
national average. ^ Qj is cardinal and represents the percent of total consumption households are
willing to forego to live in city j instead of an average city.
Household preferences are likely to differ significantl , but a useful measure of aggregate
willingness-pay is obtained by weighting each household type according to their income share,
￿g. Basing the parameters and differentials on income-weighted household averages, definin
sy =
P
g ￿gsyg and (1 ￿ ￿0)sw ^ wj ￿
P
g ￿g(1 ￿ ￿0
g)swg ^ wj
g, we may drop the subscript g from
(2) to obtain an aggregate QOL, ^ Qj ￿
P
g ￿gswg. While simple, this single index should largely
capture the average willingness to pay of most households to live in certain cities, at least for the
"marginal" households that are willing to move across cities, which in the long run, include most
Americans.7 In the absence of strong sorting, the index aggregates the preferences of those with
low income shares from labor, such as students and retirees, who care more about high prices,
with those with high income shares from labor, like young workers, who care more about wages.
The approximations also obviate the need to model production side of the economy – discussed in
Appendix A.1 and more fully in Albouy (2009b) – especially when preferences are homogenous.
Indices to accommodate household heterogeneity, moving costs, and labor-market disequilibrium
are considered in Section 5.
7 Sorting of this kind is greatly reduced if retirees decide to locate close to their children, especially if families
share income. Retirees and their working children who locate together act like a family "dynasty" as in Barro (1974).
52.1 Choosing the Correct Parameters
Simplifying somewhat, most QOL estimates in the literature are based on a single measure of
wages and a single measure of prices, namely housing costs, here termed ^ p
j
hous.8 They have also
ignored federal taxes, treated labor as the only source of income, and put the expenditure share on
housing, shous, at around 25 percent, so that (2) is reduced to
^ Q
j
unadjusted = 0:25^ p
j
hous ￿ ^ w
j (3)




adjusted = 0:33^ p
j
hous ￿ 0:51^ w
j. (4)
This formula incorporates an effective federal tax rate on labor income of 32 percent (with some
adjustments for tax benefit to owner-occupied housing), the fact that 75 percent of household
income depends on local wages, and that, netting out tax-benefit to owner-occupied housing, the
cost-of-living differences across cities are approximated by a third of housing-cost differences.
This parametrization puts only 1.5 times more weight on low wages relative to housing costs,
unlike previous studies which put 4 times more weight.9
2.2 The Effective Expenditure Share on Housing Costs
Separating goods into housing and non-housing, the cost-of-living differential may be recast as
sy ￿ b p
j = shous^ p
j
hous + soth^ p
j
oth, (5)
8"Housing cost" refers to rent or an imputed rent based on housing prices for home-owners. I follow the standard
practice of including utilities since contract rents often include them.
9More specificall the relative weight on wages relative to housing costs is 3.61 in Blomquist et al. (1988), 3.7 in
Beeson and Eberts (1989), 4.82 in Gyourko and Tracy (1991), 3.72 in Gabriel et al. (2003), 4 in Davis and Orthalo-
Magne (2007), and 2.87 in Chen and Rosenthal (2008). The latter is closest to the study here. Equation (2) is based on
a first-orde approximation of the mobility condition. As shown in Appendix A.3, a second-order approximation has
only a minute impact on QOL estimates. Furthermore, Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2007) provide empirical evidence
that shous is fairly constant across time and metropolitan areas, justifying the use of a single number for sy.
6where soth and ^ poth are the expenditure share and cost differential for non-housing goods. The
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) reports the share of gross income spent on shelter and utili-
ties, shous, is 0.213, and on other goods, soth, is 0.563 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). The other
22.4 percent is saved or taxed.
While data on regional differences in housing costs are of good quality, data on regional differ-
ences in the cost of other goods are limited. Commonly used data on other goods come from the
ACCRA Cost-of-Living Index, which measures price differences across expenditure categories.
Problems with this data, discussed by Koo, Phillips, and Sigalla (2000), are that they cover a
limited number of goods, are collected by volunteers, are meant for urban professionals, may ex-
aggerate housing-cost differences, and most importantly, have limited geographic coverage. For
this last reason, I use ACCRA data to infer how housing costs predict overall cost-of-living differ-
ences. A regression using 2004 data in natural logarithms reveals that housing costs predict other










Substituting in the regression formula, ^ p
j
oth = b^ p
j
hous + ej, into equation (5)
sy ￿ b p







Putting the parameters together, the cost-of-living differential is best predicted by weighing ^ pj
with sy = 0:362, whereby non-housing goods account for sothb=sy = 41 percent of cost-of-living
differences. Since the R2 = 0:66 implies that two thirds of non-housing costs are predicted by
housing costs, and only 14 percent of all cost-of-living variation is lost by ignoring idiosyncratic
differences in the non-housing goods seen in the error term. Low prices that are not accounted for
10The index for non-housing costs is reweighed using expenditure shared from the CEX. Results using 1999 AC-
CRA data are almost identical.
7by the housing-cost index are then implicit in a higher QOL value.11
2.3 The Share of Income from Labor
Conceptually, sw accounts for the fraction of a household’s income that depends on its location
through local wages. Non-labor income sources – such as from assets or family transfers – are
location independent. Even the value of a migrant’s home equity is effectively location indepen-
dent, since the price it can be sold for does not depend on where the migrant moves to. Previous
QOL studies have typically determined only the ratio sw=sy by assuming that each household sup-
plies one full-time/full-year worker and divided the ratio by average household rent, producing
values between 2.9 and 4.5, although there are typically 1.3 workers per household. Households
vary in the share of income they earn from labor, but on average sw is about 75 percent (Krueger
1999). This is corroborated by data in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In 2001, house-
holds received 69.3 percent of income from wages, and 11.7 percent from "business, farm, and
self-employment," some of which is derived from labor. Together, sw = 0:75 and sy = 0:36 imply
that the relative weight of wages relative to housing costs in calculating QOL is sw=sy = 2:08:12
2.4 Federal Taxes and Deductions
Federal taxes reduce the net income households gain from moving to a city offering higher wages.
As fully explained in Albouy (2009a), to calculate the effective tax rate on inter-city wage differ-
11Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (2003) use the ACCRA data directly. Because the data do not cover enough cities,
the authors cannot create individual city rankings, and instead perform their analysis by state. They claim that cost-of-
living differences within state should be small relative to differences between states, although this may be problematic
in large states such as California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York. According to my calculations, the authors used
an effective shous = 0:22 and soth = 0:38, leading to an effective sy of approximately 0.27, quite similar to the other
literature. Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2010) construct a price index similar to the one here, but incorporate ACCRA
data in cities where it is available. Shapiro (2006) uses a technique similar to the one here except he uses expenditure
weights provided by ACCRA.
Moretti (2008) runs a regression like (6) across cities over time using local Consumer Price Index data from major
cities,supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He estimates a larger value of b = 0:35. Moretti’s estimate is
somewhat larger than the one here mainly because his CPI expenditure shares do not include income saved or paid in
taxes. Once these expenditures are taken into account, the adjusted b is 0:25.
12According to Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003), the average household net worth in 2001, adjusted down
for the stock-market bubble, was $341,300, fve times the average family income of $68,000. At an annual real interest
rate of 5 percent, this is worth $17,065, or 25.1 percent of income.
8ences, several taxes must be considered. A base federal income tax rate is taken from TAXSIM
(Feenberg and Coutts 1993), which for 2000 calculates a marginal rate of 25.1 percent, and applies
to the average household, weighted by income. When combined with payroll taxes for Medicare
and OASDI – net of marginal benefit from the simulation in Boskin et al. (1987, Table 4) –
the effective federal tax rate rises to 29.6 percent.13 Tax benefit to owner-occupied housing are
also accounted for: this serves to effectively reduce the share sy. In addition, state tax rates are
incorporated to accommodate wage and price differentials within state. Although actual state-tax
differentials are calculated from state tax rates and within-state wage and price differentials, total
tax differences may be approximated by using ￿0 = 0.323 and lowering sy from 0.36 to 0.33.14
Overall, taxes lowers the wage-to-housing-cost weight from 2.08 to 1.54.
13According to the Statistics on Income, although only 33 percent of tax returns itemize, they account for 67 percent
of reported Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). Since the income-weighted share is what matters, 67 percent is multiplied
by the effective tax reduction given in TAXSIM, in 2000 of 21.6 percent. Thus, on average these deductions reduce
the effective price of eligible goods by 14.5 percent. Since eligible goods only include housing, this deduction applies
to only 59 percent of home goods. Multiplying gives an effective price reduction of 8.6 percent for home goods.
Divided by a federal tax rate of 29.6 percent, this produces a federal deduction level of 29 percent. A move to a
high-wage city could potentially increase a household’s marginal tax rate. A preliminary adjustment for progressivity
used in the second-order approximations in Appendix A.3, suggests that the impact of progressive taxes is very small.
14State-taxdifferentialsarecomputedbymultiplyingstatetaxanddeductionratesbythewageandpricedifferentials
within state and include sales taxes, since these effectively tax labor. At the state level, the average effective marginal
tax rate on wages is 6.2 percentage points, although, wage differences within state are only 44 percent as large, on
average, as wage differences within the entire country. Quality of life is computed using the augmented formula
^ Qj = (1 ￿ ￿￿0) ￿ sy^ pj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)sw ^ wj + ￿0
S[sw( ^ wj ￿ ^ wS) ￿ ￿Ssy(^ pj ￿ ^ pS)] (7)
where ￿ is the effective federal deduction rate and ￿0
S and ￿S are are marginal tax and deduction rates at the state-level,
net of federal deductions, and ^ wS and ^ pS are the differentials for state S as a whole relative to the entire country.
State income tax rates from 2000 are taken from TAXSIM, which, per dollar, fall at an average marginal rate of 4.5
percent. State sales tax data in 2000 is taken from the Tax Policy Center, originally supplied by the Federation of
Tax Administrators. The average state sales tax rate is 5.2 percent. Sales tax rates are reduced by 10 percent to
accomodate untaxed goods and services other than food or housing (Feenberg et al. 1997), and by another 8 percent in
states that exempt groceries, equal to its share of expenditures. State deductions for income taxes are calculated in an
equivalent way using TAXSIM data, and also account for how housing expenditures are deducted from the sales tax.
State adjustments raise the effective deduction level from 0.29 to 0.31.
93 Wage, Housing-Cost, and Quality-of-Life Estimates
3.1 Data
Wage and housing-cost differentials are estimated with the 5 percent sample of the U.S. Census
data from the 2000 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Cities are define at the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level using 1999 OMB definitions using consolidated defi
nitions (e.g. "San Francisco" includes Oakland and San Jose) so that commuting can be ignored,
and grouping non-metropolitan areas within each state. This produces 276 metropolitan areas and
49 non-metropolitan-area groups.
Amenity data, are divided into two categories. Natural amenities are predetermined character-
istics from climate and geography, including heating degree days and cooling degree days per year,
sunshine, coastal proximity, and average slope of the land. Artificia amenities are determined by
local inhabitants, such as restaurants and bars per capita, the Arts & Culture Index from Places
Rated, air quality, and safety. More details are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Wage and Housing-Cost Regressions
Inter-urban wage differentials are calculated from the logarithm of hourly wages for full-time
workers, ages 25 to 55. In keeping with Rosen (1979) and his successors, these differentials
control for skill differences across cities to provide a meaningful analogue to the representative
worker. Log wages are regressed on metro-indicators (￿j) and on extensive controls (X
wj
i ) – in-
teracted with gender – education, experience, race, occupation, industry, and veteran, marital, and










The coefficient ￿j are normalized to have an average of zero and equated with the wage differen-
tials, ^ wj, interpreted as the causal effect of city j’s characteristics on a worker’s wages Accord-
10ingly, city j0s average wage, lnw
j
= ￿ Xwj￿w + ￿j, is the sum of the location effect, ￿j, and the
composition effect, ￿ Xwj￿w, predicted by local worker characteristics (see Appendix Figure A4).
Across metros, the standard deviation of lnw
j
is 0.149, which is mainly accounted for by the loca-
tional effect, ￿j, which has a standard deviation of 0.128. The standard deviation of ￿ Xwj￿w is only
0.048, meaning that observed characteristics explain only a limited fraction of wage differences
across metropolitan areas . This may be surprising given the evidence on residential sorting (e.g.
Epple and Sieg, 1999), although this is focused on sorting within metropolitan areas: sorting across
metropolitan areas appears more limited, perhaps because of the complementarity of different la-
bor types within local labor markets. Differences in ￿w by city, which leads to heterogeneity in
￿j by type, are not dealt with until section 5.4, although Appendix Figure A1 shows that location
effects are remarkably similar across education groups, meaning the labor skills are somewhat,
albeit not completely uniformly priced: these differences are investigated in section 5.4.
The estimates of ￿j may be biased by selection according to unobserved skills: if this causes
wagesinlargercitiestobeoverestimated, thantheirQOLwillbeunderestimated, sinceworkersare
receiving less actual compensation to live in them. To control for sorting, I re-estimate the location
effects dropping all observations from workers who live in metropolitan areas that do not contain
their state of birth. The location effects without migrants are almost identical – regressing them on
the original effects yields a coefficien statistically indistinguishable from one (1.033, s.e. 0.026),
and a root mean squared error of only 0.015 – suggesting that selection effects are unimportant.15
Both housing values and gross rents, including utilities, are used to calculate housing-cost dif-
15Place of birth is not available at the sub-state level. This classificatio of movers follows that of Beaudry, Doms,
and Lewis (2010). In the literature, Glaeser and Maré (2001), Moretti (2004), and Baum-Snow and Pavan (2010) argue
that the urban-rural wage gap is largely unaffected by selection bias, while Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008)
argue that it is. The wage differentials could also be too small as some of the worker characteristics controlled for,
such as occupation or industry, could depend on where the worker locates, although removing these controls has only
a minute effect on the location effects.
Adjustment for unionization rates, which in 2000 range from 34.4 percent MN in Duluth to 0.6 percent in Hickory,
NC, was also considered with data from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Lewis (1986) concludes that unions raise
wages by approximately 15 percent. If higher wages are not absorbed by a higher cost-of-living – perhaps through
restricted entry into union jobs – then this could cause after-tax real incomes to be up to 2.5 percent higher in Duluth
relative to Hickory for reasons independent of local amenities, causing QOL to be underestimated in highly unionized
areas. QOL estimates amended for unionization, are only slightly different than the ones reported. Since it is unclear
whether unions actually raise wages (Dinardo and Lee 2004) without raising costs-of-living, the estimates are not
adjusted for unionization.
11ferentials. To be consistent with previous studies, imputed rents are converted from housing values
using a discount rate of 7.85 percent (Peiser and Smith 1985), to which utility costs are added:
this makes imputed rents comparable to the gross rents available for rental units. To avoid mea-
surement error from imperfect recall or rent control, the sample includes only units acquired in
the last ten years. Housing-cost differentials are calculated in a manner similar to wage differen-
tials, using a regression of gross rents on fl xible controls (X
pj
i ) - interacted with tenure - for size,
rooms, acreage, commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities, type and age of building, and the










The coefficient ￿j are used as the housing-cost differentials, and are interpreted to measure how
much costlier a standard unit of housing in city j is relative to the national average. Unobserved
differences in housing quality may bias estimates of ￿j, so that places with nicer houses are mis-
perceived to have a higher QOL. Yet the standard deviation of log housing cost is 0.277 log points,
while for observable differences it is only 0.073 (see Appendix Figure A4).16
3.3 Calculating and Visualizing Quality-of-Life Estimates
Figure 1 graphs the wage and cost differentials for different cities, with ^ w on the horizontal axis











for cities with an average QOL, i.e. ^ Qj = 0. Along this line, costs rise with wage levels so that
after-tax real incomes remain constant, as workers are paying to locate by well-paying jobs. When
costs in a city are above this line, the city is inferred to have a higher QOL in proportion to the
16Since an indicator variable is used to control for rental units, this discount rate only affects the relative valuation of
housing to utilities, and not to rental units. Malpezzi, Chun, and Green (1998) argue that housing-price indices derived
from the Census perform as well or better than most other indices. I combine housing costs and rents to avoid issues
of differing home-ownership rates across metro areas. Appendix B.2 presents evidence that rent and housing-cost
differenctials are generally similar in 2000, except in the costliest cities.
12distance from the line.
Table 1 lists wage, housing-cost, and QOL differentials for several metropolitan areas, the
nine Census divisions, and for metropolitan areas of different population sizes. Appendix Table
A1 presents estimates for all metro and non-metro areas; Appendix Table A2 presents estimates
for the states. Pacifi locations score the highest, and other cities in the West do well: Honolulu
(#1), San Francisco (#4) and San Diego (#8) are in the top 10; Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, and
Portland are all in the top 40. On the East Coast, Miami (#39), Boston (#45), and New York (#51)
are the best large cities. Cities in the Midwest and in the South generally fare less well, although
New Orleans and Chicago are above average.
QOL estimates using an (unadjusted) parametrization typical of the previous literature may be
visualized using the dashed line in Figure 1, which has slope of 4. Unlike the solid line, the dashed
line passes under most of the smaller cities in the sample, giving them a higher inferred QOL
than in the adjusted case, and above most of the larger cities, giving them a lower inferred QOL.
The adjusted QOL, using the favored parametrization, are graphed against the unadjusted QOL
estimates in Figure 2, which displays just how different they are: when weighted by population,
the correlation between the estimates is almost zero.
The largest discrepancies are in large cities, where both wages and costs are high, and smaller
cities, wherethe opposite istrue. While theadjusted estimates indicatea small positiverelationship
betweenpopulationsizeandQOL,theunadjustedestimatesindicateastarklynegativerelationship.
The unadjusted parametrization overstates the nominal income gain and understates the cost-of-
living loss from moving to larger cities, causing their QOL to be underestimated.17
Regressing QOL on wage levels and housing costs predicted by worker and housing composi-
17Most previous studies used the projection of the unadjusted QOL estimates onto the space of individual amenities
used in their regression analysis, a procedure which may have mitigated some of the problems with the unadjusted
parametrization. Beeson and Eberts (1989) were the firs authors to use the aggregate QOL measure seen here,
although their study was limited to the 35 largest cities, largely obscuring the implied negative relationship between
QOL and city size. My analysis with 1980 Census data – the same data used by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988),
Beeson and Eberts (1989), and Gyourko and Tracy (1991) – suggests that adjusted and unadjusted QOL estimates are
more positively correlated in 1980 than in 2000, although the differences in 1980 are still substantial. Adjusted QOL














The predicted coefficien on ￿ Xwj￿w is 0:51"Q;m, where "Q;m is the elasticity of QOL with re-
spect to income. Hence, "Q;m appears to be positive, but not larger than one, although this may
be confounded if skills and QOL are substitutes. The predicted coefficien on ￿ Xpj￿j is ￿"y;m,
where "y;m is the income elasticity of housing. This value is somewhat below the typical range
for "y;m, between 0.7 and 1.0 (Harmon 1988), but this could reflec that housing and amenities are
complements.18
3.4 A Test of the Parametrized Mobility-Condition Slope
The dotted line in Figure 1, estimated by regressing housing costs on wage level, motivates a test
of the parameter choices, as the difference between this line and the calibrated mobility condition
implies a statistical relationship between observed wages and unobserved QOL. Write the linear
projection of QOL on wages and an incomplete vector of amenities as ^ Qj = Zj￿Q + bQ ^ wj + ￿j,
wherebyconstructionE [￿jjZj; ^ wj] = 0. Then, accordingto(10), theexpectationof ^ pj conditional


















j￿Q + bw ^ w
j (11)
The coefficien bw is the slope of the mobility condition under the correct parametrization, (1 ￿
￿0)sw=sy, plus a term which depends on the residualized correlation of QOL with wage levels, bQ.
If bQ = 0 without any amenity controls, then the mobility condition is given by the regression line.
Moreover, any parametrization implies a value of bQ = sybw￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)sw: Estimated values of bw
18If unobserved skills are positively related with observed skills, this regression suggests that unobserved skills may
be positively related with QOL, causing QOL differences to be underestimated in cities with greater skills, such as in
some larger cities. As QOL and observable housing characterstics are negatively related, QOL may be overestimated
in cities with nicer housing, such as in some smaller cities.
14and implied values of bQ are reported in table 2.19
If QOL could be observed, then a direct regression of (10) would provide an unbiased estimate
of (1 ￿ ￿0)sw=sy, as bQ would be reduced to zero. Since QOL is unobserved, the best approach is
to control for observed amenities to minimize bQ, and to test whether the estimated bw is different
from the parametrized slope. The test results shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 reveal that
estimates of bw are close to the adjusted parametrization, and far from the unadjusted one, which
can only be correct if unobserved amenities are correlated very negatively with wage levels.20
3.5 Relationship with Other QOL Measures
Another check on the validity of the revealed-preference QOL estimates is to consider how they
correlate with city rankings based on other methods. As explained in Becker et al. (1987), the
Places Rated Almanac ranks cities along nine dimensions: climate, crime, health care, transporta-
tion, education, arts and culture, recreation, housing costs, and job outlook. These nine rankings
are averaged geometrically to determine an overall "livability" ranking. The rankings are sensitive
to many subjective decisions, but do have a certain plausibility that account for their popularity. As
seen in Panel A of Table 3, the correlation between the Places Rated and adjusted QOL rankings
is positive, while it is negative with the unadjusted QOL ranking. An issue with the "livability"
index is that it incorporates cost-of-living and job-market components that do not belong in the
revealed-preference QOL ranking. The economic QOL measure assumes that all cities are equally
good once costs-of-living and labor markets are accounted for, while Places Rated looks for cities
that offer the most valuable amenities at the lowest cost, similar to the "Best Value" recommen-
dations seen in Consumer Reports. When recalculated to remove these components, the Places
Rated ranking is correlated more positively with the adjusted ranking and more negatively with the
19The restriction bQ = 0 is implicitly assumed but not theoretically justifie by Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2002)
20It is worth noting that the parameters were intially chosen in order to predict the effect of federal taxes in Albouy
(2009a), and not to estimate QOL. Also, most of the amenity measures in the regression were chosen prior to the
development of this test. Thus, this test does not suffer from conventional pre-test bias.
15unadjusted ranking.21
I also construct a ranking based on stated preferences from the Pew Research Center by Taylor
et al. (2009). Respondents were named 10 cities in random order and asked "As I read through
the following places, just tell me your firs reaction: would you want to live in this city or its
surrounding metropolitan area or NOT want to live there?" The percent of "yes" and "no" responses
are used to construct stated-preference rankings of 28 cities, which, as seen in Panel B of Table 3,
are positively correlated with both QOL rankings, especially the adjusted one.22
The QOL estimates here also differ substantially from other revealed-preference estimates in
the economic literature. As seen in Panel C, at the state level, the QOL estimates in Gabriel, Mattey
and Wascher (2003) are correlated weakly to the adjusted estimates, but strongly to the unadjusted
ones. As seen in Panel D, at the metro level, the QOL estimates in Chen and Rosenthal (2008) are
correlated positively with the adjusted estimates and even more so with the unadjusted estimates,
especially when non-metro areas are included. The similarity with the adjusted estimates arises as
Chen and Rosenthal use a wage/housing cost weight of 2.86 – the smallest in the previous literature
– although they still rank large cities like New York and Chicago well below average.23
21An additional support for the adjusted QOL estimates is provided by Carlino and Saiz (2008), who fin that the
adjusted QOL estimates are positively correlated with the number of tourist visits in a city.
22This ranking has shortcomings as they are from 2008 and respondents were not told to ignore labor-market op-
portunities or cost-of-living, and all of the listed cities are fairly large. Nonetheless, the answers are likely to reflec
cities that respondents consider to have an attractive QOL.
23Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (2003) use an effective wage/housing-cost weight of 3:72, taking into account their
use of ACCRA data for non-housing costs. Shapiro (2006) takes into account non-housing costs, but never provides
QOL measures.
164 Quality of Life and Individual Amenities
4.1 Two-Step Estimates
Based on hedonic theory, the QOL values may be used to estimate how much value households















=￿ m measures the fraction of gross income a household is
willing to pay for one more unit of amenity k. Multiplying this coefficien by average gross house-
hold income ($68,000 in 2000) produces the dollar value. The residual "Qj results from measure-
ment error, unobserved amenities, mis-specification and unobserved differences in housing quality

























k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)sw￿w
k :
Beginning with Rosen (1979), previous studies have typically estimated amenity values using
individual-level wage and housing-cost equations like (8) and (9), with a vector of amenity vari-
ables in place of MSA dummy variables, essentially substituting in (13). This one-step method
produces estimates of ￿
p
k and ￿w
k similar to the two-step method outlined above when the same
amenities and weights are used in both equations (Ameniya 1978). The QOL estimates reported






k, which depends on the amenities chosen and
ignores the residual, "Qj. Issues around clustering can cause standard errors from the one-step
method to be toosmall (Gyourko, Kahn, andTracy 1999), while the two-step method provides con-
servative standard errors (Wooldridge 2003) and a coefficien of multiple correlation (R-squared),
describing how much QOL is explained by measured amenities.24
24Clustering at the city level in the one-step method produces standard errors for amenity values similar to those in
17Whatever the specifi method, inferring specifi amenity values with cross sectional data faces
many conventional potential pitfalls. There is a high degree of collinearity between the amenity
variables, making it difficul to obtain precise estimates for a reasonably large set of variables. Un-
measured amenities, such as a city’s downtown charm, may contribute to omitted variable biases.
Furthermore, artificia amenities may be highly endogenous, subjecting their estimated values to
additional skepticism. Yet, oftentimes there is no other recourse, due to the unavailability of nat-
ural experiments and confounding factors in the dynamics of urban price and wage changes over
time.
4.2 Dependence of Quality of Life on Amenities
Table 4 presents amenity-value estimates, with each measure signed so that each is an amenity,
which a priori should yield a positive valuation. Column 1, which includes only natural amenities,
estimates that households pay 0.89 percent of income to live in areas with 1000 fewer heating
degree days, which translates to 3.9 percent of income for all excessive cold in a typical area; for
cooling degree days the estimate is 3.13, which translates to 4.0 percent of income to eliminate
a typical area’s excessive heat. Households pay 2.9 percent of income to live in areas where 10
percent more of the day is sunny (1.29 standard deviations), 1.7 percent of income to live in areas
with a standard deviation higher inverse distance to the coast, and 2.7 percent of income to live
in areas where the average slope is 10 percent higher. It is questionable whether these measures
reflec true valuations of these amenities, but they seem plausible and it is remarkable that these
fve variables explain 70 percent of the variation in the adjusted QOL measure. As seen in columns
2 and 3, the amenity variables are better at explaining housing costs than wages. Estimates with the
unadjusted QOL measures in column 4, more reliant on wages, explain less and lack plausibility,
with households paying to live in hot areas away from the coast, without caring significantl about
cold or sunshine.25
the two-step method. Technically, the cities should be weighted by the predicted income of the inhabitants, although
for transparency and simplicity, I weight them by population here, which produces almost identical results.
25Additional climate measures, such as annual rainfall, wind speed or humidity are generally not significan in these
regressions. Separating Great Lake coasts from salt-water coasts results in slightly higher, but insignif cantly different,
18Columns 5 through 6 add artificia amenities. The adjusted estimates show that households
have a high willingness-to-pay to live in areas with many eating and drinking establishments, arts
and culture, and better air quality. However, there is no significan association between estimated
QOL and indices of either property or violent crime. This demonstrates the limitations of the
hedonic approach, especially for amenities that vary significantl within a metropolitan area.26
Nevertheless, theestimatesappearbetteradjusted, astheyfin coasts, culture, andsunny, temperate
climates to be goods.27
4.3 Amenities and City Size
Urbanamenitiesanddisamenitiesdependlargelyonurbanpopulationanddensity, includingsafety,
cleanliness, and cultural and consumption (Rosen 1979; Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz 2001). Including
a metropolitan population variable in (12) helps to account for the amenities, observed or not, that
are correlated with or endogenously result from city size. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 5 re-
port that population is related positively to adjusted QOL, but very negatively to unadjusted QOL,
demonstrating the anti-urban bias in the previous literature. Controlling for amenities in columns
3 through 6 causes the relationship to disappear with adjusted QOL, but not with unadjusted QOL.
The positive relationship between adjusted QOL and population is due to cities being larger where
there is a nicer climate and geography, reflectin the household location choices noted by Rap-
paport and Sachs (2003) and Rappaport (2007). Using a density measure in place of a density
measure in Panel B, produces rather similar results, albeit slightly in favor of denser cities being
nicer places to live.28
valuations for sea coasts.
26Rosenthal and Ross (2010) argue that economically vibrant areas are favored targets for crime, further complicat-
ing the ability to identify the value of safety from cross-sectional data.
27Commuting time is not entered as an independent variable as this is an endogenous variable from the individual’s
viewpoint. Workers should be willing to commute longer hours in order to live in a more desirable metropolitan area.
Empirically, the elasticity of commuting time with respect to population size is roughly 0.10. Assuming commuting
takes 10 percent of the working day and monetary costs are 5 percent of income, this implies that commuting increases
the elasticity of QOL with respect to population by 0.015:
28While this analysis find that there is no empirical relationship between city size and QOL it does not definitvely
prove that there is no causal relationship. The slightly positive relationship between QOL and population is reduced to
zero once natural amenities are controlled for, as the population size endogenously depends on available amenities. It
195 Taste Heterogeneity and Imperfect Mobility
5.1 Amending the Basic Model
There are many ways to model heterogenous households, many of them perplexing. But it is
possible to incorporate a continuous form of heterogeneity into the model that is tractable and
useful for understanding a number of phenomena. Suppose that QOL in city j is dependent on a
universal component Qj, and a household-specifi component, ￿
j
i, so that overall QOL for house-





i. Furthermore, assume that ￿
j
i is Pareto distributed with parameter
1= : F(￿
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i ￿ ￿. A higher   implies greater heterogeneity in preferences,
with   = 0 corresponding to the model with homogenous preferences. For simplicity, assume
that the outside utility for households is given by a constant ￿ u. For some given constant, Nj
max,
there exists a marginal household k with taste parameter ￿
j






















Fully differentiating the equilibrium condition (1), treating N as an endogenous variable, and
noting that (14) implies ^ Nj = ￿^ ￿
j
k= ; leads to an extended version of equation (2):
sy^ p
j ￿ sw(1 ￿ ￿
0)^ w
j = ^ Q
j
￿   ^ N
j. (15)
This says that the marginal willingness-to-pay to live in city j, given by the left-hand side, de-
creases by   percent of income, when the population increases by one percent.   may para-
metrize household mobility, with   = 0 and   = 1 characterizing perfect mobility and im-
is conceivable that, holding natural amenities fi ed, adding population to existing cities could lower QOL by increasing
artificia urban disamenities. For this hypothesis to hold, there should be some unobserved, presumably natural,
amenity that when controlled for would make the QOL-population gradient negative. Nevertheless, if this hypothesis
is true, then controlling for artificia amenities should cause the population-QOL gradient to rise, which it did not
appreciably, as controlling for urban disamenities should have made larger cities more attractive. Furthermore, since
the measured amenities explain much of the existing variation in QOL, it is difficul to imagine that there is such an
important unmeasured amenity that is unaccounted for.
20mobility, respectively. Rearranging (15) provides an upward-sloping local-labor supply curve
in terms of wages and QOL, as well as a downward-sloping demand curve in terms of local
prices: ^ Nj = [sw (1 ￿ ￿0) ^ wj ￿ sy^ pj + ^ Q
j
]= . The more willingness-to-pay to live in a city varies
across individuals, the less elastic is its labor supply, as inframarginal households need to be paid
an increasing premium to move to it.
5.2 Population Level and Density
How the universal QOL component, ^ Q
j
, may be measured depends on how ^ Nj is interpreted.
Interpreting ^ Nj as the population deviation from the national average, whereby Nj
max is constant
across cities, is a natural way to account for preference heterogeneity. If a small number of indi-
viduals enjoy an amenity, say a coastal location, the few who enjoy it will likely have the highest
marginal willingness-to-pay for it. Such is seen in discrete-choice models – which, as shown in
Appendix A.4, can produce equation (15) – since they are identifie off of the population shares
residing in different locations. This implies that more populous cities offer a higher QOL than is
implied by wages and costs alone: if two cities offer the same wages and costs, the more populated
city is deemed the one most amenable to the typical individual.
When considering tastes for city size, it may be better to characterize cities according to pop-
ulation size alone as the taste components, ￿
j
i, should be correlated across cities of the same size.
In this case, Zipf’s (1949) law for cities – the empirical findin that a city’s population is inversely
proportional to its rank, confirme for the U.S. by Ioannides and Overman (2003) – implies that the
population is uniformly distributed across city sizes. Thus, adjusting for heterogenous preferences
does not change the conclusion that households are, on the margin, indifferent over city sizes.
Regressions of city size on amenities, seen in column 1 of Table 6, show a positive relationship
betweenpopulationsize andcoastalproximity, althoughthatis theonlysignifican naturalamenity.
Due to what are surely endogenous processes, there are also positive relationships with arts and
culture, air pollution, and violent crime. The relationship with property crime is negative, as it is
with restaurants and bars per capita, although both estimates are susceptible to division bias, since
21the measures are per capita. Since the land areas of cities increase with size, it may be preferable to
consider the relationship between population density and amenities, as this effectively treats each
acre of land as a separate choice. As seen in column 2, population density is positively related to
both sunshine and coastal proximity, as well as arts and culture, but not significantl to the other
variables.
The use of population levels or densities to value amenities is problematic if place-specifi
tastes depend on local attachments, which are state dependent on previous population levels. These
levels depend on previous local employment and housing opportunities, as well as amenities. Thus,
Detroit may have a large population not because it offers a high QOL relative to its real-wage level,
but because of its once vibrant economy. Existing residents have attachments to the area, but these
are not of value to potential migrants.
5.3 Population Growth and Labor-Market Disequilibrium
In certain applications, ^ Nj is better measured as the deviation relative to a previous population
level, say where Nj
max is determined by previous population levels. Viewed dynamically, migration
fl ws are expected to occur to cities where real wages are high relative to universal QOL, i.e. to
cities that are "under-priced" relative to the amenities they offer. This disequilibrium may reflec
factor imbalances that will be corrected for. In principle,   should fall towards zero as the time-
period in question expands: location-specifi tastes are more homogenous over the long run, as
households adapt to local amenities, lose attachments to old locations, and amortize moving costs
over a longer time period. Indeed, most Americans originate from populations in the Old World
that migrated less than two centuries ago. But in the shorter-run, households must be offered a
real-wage premium to move, and a larger premium attracts more migrants. It may also reflec
that recent migrants may not receive as much of a premium as existing residents, at least at first
This insight provides a micro-foundation for the disequilibrium model in Greenwood et al. (1991),
whereby a city’s QOL is measured through a weighted combination of its population growth and
22minus its real income.29
Figure 3 illustrates how city growth may be used to amend QOL estimates by plotting popula-
tion changes between 1980 and 2000 against the original adjusted QOL estimates. This adjustment
increases the value of fast-growing cities, like Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Atlanta. Slower-growth
cities like Pittsburgh, Chicago, and New York, should have their QOL estimates lowered as work-
ers there accept a real wage discount to preserve their local attachments. The positive correlation
between growth rates and the adjusted QOL measures suggests that QOL differences may be larger
than the original measure and that households may have an increasing preference for non-market
goods. Gibrat’s law for cities (Gabaix 1999) – the empirical findin that population growth rates
are independent of city size – implies that adjusting for population growth should not bias prefer-
ences towards or against city size.
A regression based on population growth in Column 3 of Table 6 find that warm areas are
gaining population, consistent with Glaeser and Tobio (2007), so that aversion to heat may be
overvalued in Table 4. Sunny and sloped areas are also growing, meaning those amenities deserve
higher values. Coastal proximity is negatively related to growth, as coastal areas have largely fille
up: thus, as implied by the "superstar cities" hypothesis of Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006)
– amenities in tight supply see their marginal valuation rise at a faster rate than their average
valuation, as the national population grows. Growth rates are positively related to arts and culture,
and negatively with violent crime, although these effects could be endogenous. Yet, while growth
should increase pollution, populations are migrating towards areas with cleaner air.30
Combining growth rates with wage and housing costs to measure QOL and amenity values
requires determining the weight  . This is a behavioral parameter that can be estimated off of the
29Greenwood et al. (1991) separately estimate actual and equilibrium real wages, and fin that in only 7 out of
51 cases are the two the statistically different at the 90 percent significanc level (Hunt 1993). Their QOL estimates
depend inversely on real wages and emigration, but are not adjusted for federal taxes or non-labor income. They are
higher for Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Dakota than they are for Hawaii and California.
30Quigley and Raphael (2005), Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks. (2005), and Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) argue
that supply restrictions on housing in areas, such as California, have caused housing costs in these areas to increase
disproportionately without wage or amenity improvement. Yet, in the traditional Rosen-Roback model with homoge-
nous households, supply restrictions in a single city raise housing costs nationwide but do not increase the relative
price in that city, holding wages constant, although they do reduce local population.
23impact of labor demand shocks on wages and housing costs, assuming that QOL are unaffected by
thoseshocks. EstimatesinthisstylefromNotowidigdo(2010)showwagesandhousingcostsmove
closely together, implying small values of  , around 0.05 or below, although an extreme value of
  = 0:1 is used here for illustration and to account for possible QOL endogeneity.31 Dashed
lines tracing out cities with the same amended QOL are drawn in Figure 3. Column 4 of Table
5 presents amended amenity valuations using a value of   = 0:1, which show a somewhat more
balanced dislike for heat relative to cold, stronger tastes for slopes, culture, and air quality, and
weaker tastes for coastal location. Interestingly, these reduced-form results reflec core finding
in the structural migration models of Bishop (2008) and Sinha and Cropper (2009), who fin very
large valuations for clean air and warm weather, respectively, as their estimation technique puts
weight on growth (i.e.  ) that is quite large relative to wages and costs.
5.4 Preference Heterogeneity across Observed Types
Several studies have given considerable attention to how households with different skills value
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2) (16)
The standard case assumes  1 =  2 = 0, so that type 1 is paid a premium relative to type 2, i.e.
^ w
j
1 > ^ w
j
2 if it i) enjoys the amenities of the city less, ^ Q
j
1 < ^ Q
j
2; ii) is in a costlier city and has a
higher housing expenditure share, sy1^ pj > sy2^ pj; and also if it iii) faces a higher marginal tax rate,
￿0
1 > ￿0
2; or iv) receives a smaller share of income from labor, sw1 > sw2. Definin ~ sw ￿ (1￿￿0)sw
31Notowidigdo (2010, Tables 2 and 4) find that over 10 years a positive employment shock that leads to 1.8
point increase in population, leads to a 0.52 point increase in wages and a 0.80 increase in housing costs. Using the
calibration here, this is only a 0.01 increase in real income. The effect becomes larger with the size of the shock,
increasing to 0.03 with a positive shock of one standard deviation. The linearized derivative, a good indicator of  , is
approximately 0.05. However, if QOL improves differentially in growing areas, which it may, this parameter will be
biased downwards.
24and assuming  1 =  2 =  , we can rearrange (16) into the regression equation
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where "j = (~ sw ￿ ~ sw2)(^ w
j
2 ￿ ^ wj) ￿ (~ sw ￿ ~ sw1)(^ w
j
1 ￿ ^ wj) is orthogonal to ^ wj by construction.32
The left-hand side of (17) expresses the relative willingness-to-pay of type 1 households, as a
fraction of total income, for overall wage levels, ^ wj, cost levels, ^ pj, and amenities. The last term,
￿ ( ^ N
j
1 ￿ ^ N
j
2), expresses how higher relative wages elicits higher relative supplies. A positive
  may be rationalized even in a static setting, if workers of different types are attached to each
other, and costly to separate. For instance, a family may have workers with different skills; see
also Heckman and Scheinkman (1987).
This model is illustrated here with two worker types: college (type 1) and high-school (type
2). Figure 4 graphs relative differences in their wages, ^ w1 ￿ ^ w2; and quantities, ^ N
j
1 ￿ ^ N
j
2, the
latter measured through a Katz and Murphy (1992) index.33 According to statistics from the SCF
and CEX, high-school workers get a greater share of their income from wages, with ~ sw1 ￿ ~ sw2 =
￿0:120, and spend a greater share of their income on housing and local goods, with sy2 ￿ sy1 =
0:061.34 Thus, they need to be paid relatively more to live in expensive areas, but will accept less
of a premium in areas where overall wage levels are high. Column 1 of Table 7 demonstrates that
this prediction is largely upheld. In principle, a regression of (17) should also be able to identify
32This follows from ^ wj = ￿ ^ w
j
1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ w
j
2 and ~ sw = ￿~ sw1 + (1 ￿ ￿)~ sw2 for the same constant ￿, which is true
for ￿ = 0:55.
33The Katz-Murphy Index determines the number of college (high school) workers by giving workers a weight of
1 (0) with a college degree, 0.38 (0.67) with some college, 0 (1) with a high-school degree, and -0.39 (1.11) with less
than a high-school degree. The weights for workers with some college or less than high school, are determined by
regressing their location effects on the location effects for college and high-school workers. The weights are somewhat
close to Katz and Murphy’s, despite the fact that the variation of wages is across metros, rather than across years.
34According to the 2000 CEX, the gross expenditure share on shelter and utilities is 0.191 for college graduates and
0.227 for high-school graduates. If we inflat both of these shares by 1.69 to include non-housing goods, the shares
become 0.324 and 0.385. In the SCF, the ratio of family net worth to income for college-headed familes is 1.69 times
that of high-school-headed families, producing, sw1 = 0:706 while sw2 = 0:822. According to figure in Piketty
and Saez (2007), marginal federal taxes are about 2.5 percentage points lower for high-school incomes and 2.5 points
higher for college incomes. Thus (1 ￿ ￿0
1)sw1 = 0:460 and (1 ￿ ￿0
2)sw2 = 0:577: Notowidigdo (2010, Table 3) does
not fin significantl different effects of employment shocks on college and non-college workers, implying similar
values for  1 and  2, although the model here refers to levels and not changes. Berry and Glaeser (2005) document
that human capital differences across cities doubled between 1970 and 2000.
25 , and relative valuations for amenities, ^ Q
j
1 ￿ ^ Q
j
2: With these additional variables in column 2,
the coefficient on ^ wj and ^ pj are both very close to their predicted values.35 The estimate of   is
negative, but small and insignificant This relative valuation for amenities are curious, suggesting
that college-educated households seem to have a weaker aversion to cold and a weaker taste for
coastal proximity, although these estimates could be biased by omitted amenities.36 The coefficien
on property crimes that high-school educated households have a greater aversion to property crime,
perhaps as they are more likely to locate in neighborhoods where it is concentrated.
A limitation with the above analysis is that relative wages depend only on labor-supply fac-
tors. To consider demand factors, assume that aggregate labor input in city production may






g denotes the productivity of type g in city j. Then, relative
labor demand is decreasing in the relative wage and increasing with relative productivity, if ￿ > 1:
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With (16), relative wage and quantity differences are determined in the case where sy1 = sy2 and
~ sw1 = ~ sw2:
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Relative productivity differences appear in wage differences only if   > 0 and ￿ 6= 1, and become
dominant as ￿ or   ! 1. Both relative productivity and QOL differences impact labor quantities
positively when ￿ > 1, but become less important as   ! 1.
The lack of a clear positive or negative relationship in Figure 4 between relative wages and
35Using 1990 data, Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2009) fin similar results for sy, but do not calibrate the
prediction or control for overall wage levels. The prediction does not hold with 2000 data without controlling for the
overall wage level.
36Without conditioning on wages and costs, coastal proximity has a positive correlation with relative college-worker
willingness-to-pay as well as supply.
26supplies across cities suggests that neither supply nor demand factors dominate their relationship.
The figur includes an upward-sloping hypothetical relative indifference curve, using   = 0:1
and ~ sw = 0:51 in ^ w1 ￿ ^ w2 = ( =~ sw)( ^ N1 ￿ ^ N2), derived from (16) assuming equal prices, costs,
and amenity values: areas to the lower-right of this relative supply curve are predicted to have
higher costs, lower overall wages, or better amenities for college relative to high-school workers.
A downward-sloping hypothetical substitution locus for firm is also drawn, using ￿ = 2 using,
^ w1 ￿ ^ w2 = ￿(1=￿)( ^ N1 ￿ ^ N2), derived from (18) assuming equal productivities: cities to the
upper-right of this relative demand curve may offer productive advantages to college workers.37
Notice that if   = 0, the supply curve is horizontal, meaning that college-educated households
have stronger preferences for Las Vegas and Texarkana, and weaker preferences for Washington,
DC and New York. The sloped line with   = 0:1 reverses these relative preferences, making them
more plausible, and attributes the relative wage differences to high-school workers being relatively
productive in Las Vegas and less so in Washington.38
The amended valuations in column 4 combine the valuations in column 2 with the relative
supply amounts in column 3, attaching a weight of   = 0:1 to them, assuming this weight was in-
correctly estimated in column 2. These results mainly reinforce previous ones, but also strengthen
the evidence that college-educated workers have a greater demand for arts and culture and clean
air, although they could be affecting their supply as well as their demand.
37The ￿ elasticity is calibrated to model productivity feedbacks. If productivity depends on absolute productivity
differences and the relative supply of workers of one’s own type: ^ A
j
1 ￿ ^ A
j
2 = ￿A( ^ N
j
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j
2) + ( ^ A
j
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j
2). then a
feedback-corrected elasticity of substitution is ￿￿ = ￿=[1 ￿ ￿A(￿ ￿ 1)]. ￿￿ = 2 is consistent with ￿ = 1:4 from
Katz and Murphy (1992) and ￿A = 0:075. Berry and Glaeser (2005) present a model where relative productivity
differences affect relative wage levels but implicitly assume ￿ = 1. Positive feedbacks in prefernces can increase the
tendency to sort, if ^ Q
j
1 ￿ ^ Q
j
2 = ￿Q( ^ N
j
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j
2) + ( ^ Q
j
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j
2
), then a feed-back correccted  ￿ =   ￿ ￿Q.
38Another possibility is that   > 0 controls for selection bias if worker types with better unobserved skills sort
preferentially into areas where a greater number of them live. For example, New York may have a high measure of
relative wages for college workers because of sorting rather than supply and demand factors, which is reflecte in the
relatively larger supply of these workers.
276 Conclusion
Neither population size nor density appear to negatively impact American QOL in modern times:
it appears that urbanization’s amenities largely compensate for its disamenities. Thus, there is
no reason to see urbanization as lowering economic welfare, undermining arguments for policies
to disperse the population to mitigate negative urban externalities. While most policy-makers
are concerned about improving the amenities in their cities, the fact that most QOL differences
are explained by natural amenities suggests that policy-makers should also consider ways to help
households move to places with greater sun, mountains, coastal proximity, or temperate seasons.
For instance, they could consider relaxing restrictions to residential development on lands well-
endowed by nature, as higher densities are unlikely to reduce, and may even improve, local QOL.
Methodologically, it is encouraging that revealed-preference estimates of QOL are not at odds
with popular notions of what cities are nice places to live, although hedonic methods suggest
that certain amenities, such as climate and coastal proximity, may deserve greater weight than
popular rankings may put on them. This work may renew confidenc that revealed-preference and
hedonicmethods, whenproperlyapplied, mayproducesensibleresultsevenwhenrelyingoncross-
sectional data, although all of the estimates provided here certainly deserve greater scrutiny. Better
accounting for taxes, household incomes, and expenditures may also help to improve research on
QOL and local labor markets in future research.
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36Appendix - Not for Publication
A Additional Theoretical Details
A.1 Aggregation of Types
To aggregate types, let labor be aggregated according to the CES aggregator in section 5.4 and
for simplicity, that there are two goods: a good x traded across cities, and a home good, y, like
housing, that is not traded and has a price pj. Production is assumed to have constant returns to
scale in labor, which can differ by household, together with capital and home-goods, which can be
used as inputs. In equilibrium, because firm are mobile, the unit cost function for x must equal
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where ￿g is used to denote the cost-share of each labor type. Let the share of national income
accruing to type g worker be ￿g = ￿ Ng ￿ mg=
P












and let sx = 1 ￿ sy.
A case worth considering is one where type-1 households receive all of their income from
wages, and type-2 households receive all their income from capital and land. This approximates
the situations of prime-age workers, whose incomes are fully tied to local-wage levels, and retirees,
whose incomes are completely independent of local-wage levels. Thus ￿1 = sw = sx￿1 and
￿b = 1￿sw = sy+sx (1 ￿ ￿1). Inthissituation, weexpect1-typestosortintohigh-wagecities, and
2-types into low-wage cities. Nevertheless, approximating around the average city where sorting
effects are neutralized,
sy1^ p
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Averaging these two equations according to their shares of total income, sw and 1 ￿ sw, produces
equation (2) in the main text. This result is more approximate in cities with prices and wages far
from the average, where sorting is more of an issue. A second-order approximation would require
that labor income be weighed more heavily in high-wage cities.
An advantage of using income-weighted averages is that it produces sensible comparative stat-
ics results when considering the effect of differences in QOL and productivity for either household-
type on wages and home-good prices. Ignoring taxes for expositional ease, solving the system



















sx ^ AX (A.4)
where sR = sy +sx￿Y. The term beginning with ￿1 explains how type 1 is paid less in cities with
amenities it values relatively more. Both types are paid more in productive cities, ^ AX, regardless
of which type of labor is made more productive. The home-good and average wage differential,






























reflectin how local QOL and productivity fully determine cost and wage differences across cities.
A.2 Functional Form and Aggregation over Incomes
Assume that utility takes the following form with separable labor supply and ￿Q representing the






















where ￿ = the marginal utility of consumption. In the case where quality-of-life and consumption
are perfect substitutes, ￿Q ! 1, then pQ = !=￿, which is constant. If instead, preferences are







In the perfect substitutes case, the willingness to pay for quality-of-life remains constant with in-
come. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the willingness to pay rises proportionally with income. It is this
latter case which more consistent with the theoretical presentation and with the semi-logarithmic
functional forms justifie empirically in Section B.3.
A.3 Second-Order Approximation of the Mobility Condition
The first-orde approximation of QOL in equation (2) may be expanded into a second-order ap-


































where ￿c is the compensated elasticity of demand for home goods, and "(1￿￿0) is the elasticity of







In a progressive tax system the marginal tax rate is increasing, so ￿00 > 0, implying that this
elasticity should be negative. Equation (A.7) accounts for three phenomena. First, if ￿D < 1,
then the home-good expenditure share, sy, increases with ^ pj, as the demand for home goods is
inelastic. Second, because of progressivity, households who move to higher-wage areas pay a
higher tax rate, reducing the net-of tax rate (1 ￿ ￿0). Third, households in higher-wage areas
derive a larger fraction of income from labor sources, seen in an increasing sw.
The impact of using the second-order approximation is considered using parameter values of
￿c and "(1￿￿0) that lead to the largest plausible deviation from the first-orde approximation. A
value of ￿c = 0:5 is close to the lower bound of plausible values from a variety of housing-demand
estimates, including Rosen (1985), Goodman and Kawai (1986), Goodman (1988) Ermisch, Find-
lay, and Gibb (1996), Goodman (2002), and Ionnides and Zabel (2003). Estimates of "(1￿￿0) that I
obtained using data from Piketty and Saez (2007) are small, with a value of "(1￿￿0) = ￿0:1 being
the furthest plausible value away from zero.
iiiUsing these values, mobility conditions for ^ Qj levels of 0.1, 0, and -0.1 are plotted in Figure
A1 using the first-orde approximation, shown by the solid lines, and the second-order, shown by
the dashed lines. Overall, the firs and second-order approximations are similar. A closer look of
the second-order approximation suggests that the first-orde QOL estimates may be overestimated
in high-wage-high-cost areas, but only by a very small amount.
A.4 Discrete Choice Modeling
The model presented in (5.1) has very similar implications to the discrete choice model often used















where and ￿ij represents a taste parameter of person i for city j. With this specification we can
then represent indirect utility as quasilinear: V
j





choose the city that maximizes utiility, which assume for simplicity is known. Additionaly, assume
that ￿
j
i follows a double-exponentiated (Gumbel) distribution with zero mean and variance ￿2 2
g=6.




















The denominator on the right-hand side may be treated as a constant, B, since it does vary by city,
and since we are modeling a city which only contains a small portion of the total population. When
the total population is ￿ Ng, then the population of that type in city j is
N
j











Taking logs and rearraning






Log-linearizing this formula, treating B as a constant, gives
 g ^ N
j
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which is a simple generalization of (15). The assumption of quasilinearity, which avoids the prob-
lem of modeling income effects, is fairly innocuous for marginal households, whose second option
offer almost the same utility as their firs choice. This model may be amended to have ^ Nj
g as a
dynamic change, relative to a previous level, by incorporating a switching costs for moving from
one city to another, as seen in Kennan and Walker (2003).
ivB Data and Estimation Details
B.1 Wage and Housing Cost Data
I use United States Census data from the 2000 Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS),
from Ruggles et al. (2004), to calculate wage and housing price differentials. The average city
has 14,199 wage and 11,119 housing-price observations; the smallest city has 1093 wage and 817
housing-price observations.
The wage differentials are calculated for workers ages 25 to 55, who report working at least
30 hours a week, 26 weeks a year. The MSA assigned to a worker is determined by their place of
residence, rather than their place of work. The wage differential of an MSA is found by regressing
log hourly wages on individual covariates and indicators for a worker’s MSA of residence, using
the coefficient on these MSA indicators. The covariates consist of
￿ 12 indicators of educational attainment;
￿ a quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of education;
￿ 9 indicators of industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification)
￿ 9 indicators of employment at the one-digit level (1950 classification)
￿ 4 indicators of marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated);
￿ an indicator for veteran status, and veteran status interacted with age;
￿ 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other);
￿ an indicator of immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status interacted
with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other;
￿ 2 indicators for English proficien y (none or poor).
All covariates are interacted with gender.
I firs run the regression using census-person weights. From the regressions a predicted wage
is calculated using individual characteristics alone, controlling for MSA, to form a new weight
equal to the predicted wage times the census-person weight. These new income-adjusted weights
are needed since workers need to be weighted by their income share (see Appendix A.1). The new
weights are then used in a second regression, which is used to calculate the city-wage differentials
from the MSA indicator variables. In practice, this weighting procedure has only a small effect on
the estimated wage differentials.
Housing-cost differentials are calculated using the logarithm of rents, whether they are reported
gross rents or imputed rents derived from housing values. Only housing units moved into within
the last 10 years are included in the sample to ensure that the price data are fairly accurate. The
differential housing cost of an MSA is calculated in a manner similar to wages, except using a
regression of the actual or imputed rent on a set of covariates at the unit level. The covariates for
the adjusted differential are
v￿ 9 indicators of building size;
￿ 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number
of rooms interacted with number of bedrooms, and the number of household members per
room;
￿ 2 indicators for lot size;
￿ 7 indicators for when the building was built;
￿ 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
￿ an indicator for commercial use;
￿ an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
Ifirs runaregressionofhousingvaluesonhousingcharacteristicsandMSAindicatorvariables
using only owner-occupied units, weighting by census-housing weights. A new value-adjusted
weight is calculated by multiplying the census-housing weights by the predicted value from this
firs regression using housing characteristics alone, controlling for MSA. A second regression is
runusingthesenewweightsforallunits, rentedandowner-occupied, onthehousingcharacteristics
fully interacted with tenure, along with the MSA indicators, which are not interacted. The house-
price differentials are taken from the MSA indicator variables in this second regression. As with
the wage differentials, this adjusted weighting method has only a small impact on the measured
price differentials.
Differences in wages and housing-costs predicted by observable characteristics are illustrated
in Appendix Figure A4.
B.2 Comparing Housing Costs and Rents
In measuring housing costs, it is sensible to use both rental and owner-occupied units, since to-
gether these capture the housing costs of residents in a city. Nevertheless, across cities the ratio of
housing prices to rents can vary substantially. Figure A2 graphs the housing-cost differentials used
above, which are based on both actual rents and imputed rents of owner-occupied units, against
actual rents. Across most cities, rent and housing-price differences are fairly similar, and so the
two measures are fairly close. In cities with housing-cost differentials above 0.2, such as Boston,
Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco, these housing-cost differentials are significantl larger
than rent differentials. Since housing prices should reflec the present value of the stream of future
rents, this suggests that relative rents in these cities were expected to rise, although it is not clear
whether rents were expected to rise because of improvements in QOL, improvements in the local
job-market, or for other reasons.
Using only rent differentials would result in lower QOL estimates for these higher-cost cities.
However, there are a number of problems with using only rent differentials. First, rent control
in cities such as San Francisco and New York may artificiall depress rents. Second, home-
ownership rates decline significantl as price-to-rent ratios rise, which implies that the share of
rental units in the sample is larger in high-price cities. Using both rental and owner-occupied units
avoids the issue of having to deal with changes in the sample composition due to changes in the
vihome-ownership rate. In order to avoid these problems, and to preserve comparability with QOL
estimates in the existing measure, the traditional measure of housing costs is used in the analysis
here.
B.3 Functional Form
Wage and housing-cost differentials are measured logarithmically, so that ^ Qj in (2) is measured as
the fraction of income a household is willing to pay (or to accept if negative) to live in city j, rather
than an in an average city. Most studies have measured QOL in dollar terms. As explained in Ap-
pendix A.2, when aggregating across households with different incomes, the choice of logarithms
applies best when households value amenities proportionally to their income, rather than in stable
dollar amounts regardless of income.
Empirically, the semi-logarithmic functional form in (8) and (9) is supported by work in
Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988), who use maximum likelihood estimation with a Box-Cox
transformation of the form (w￿ ￿ 1)=￿. They fin that a value of ￿ = 0:1 best fit the data for
wages, and ￿ = 0:2 for housing costs, both of which are fairly close to ￿ = 0, which corresponds
to the logarithm. Similar estimates (not shown) using much larger samples from the 2000 Census,
and with MSA dummy variables on the right-hand side (rather than measured amenities), result in
estimates of ￿ close to 0:1 for both wages and housing costs. This is not dependent on the control
variables, as a similar value of ￿ is estimated if predicted effects of the controls are firs subtracted
from wages and prices, with the residuals then regressed on the MSA dummies. Thus, city wage
and housing-cost differentials across worker and housing types are best expressed in percentage
terms rather than in dollar amounts.
B.4 Amenity Data
All climate and geographic data are calculated at the public-use microdata area (PUMA) and aver-
aged up to the metropolitan level, weighted by population. Population density is measured at the
census tract level, and also population-averaged.
Heating and cooling degree days (Annual) Degree day data are used to estimate amounts of en-
ergy required to maintain comfortable indoor temperature levels. Daily values are computed
from each days mean temperature (max + min/2). Daily heating degree days are equal to
maxf0;65￿meantempg and daily cooling degree days are maxf0;meantemp￿65g. An-
nual degree days are the sum of daily degree days over the year. The data here refer to
averages from 1970 to 2000 (National Climactic Data Center 2008).
Sunshine Average percentage of possible. The total time that sunshine reaches the surface of the
earth is expressed as the percentage of the maximum amount possible from sunrise to sunset
with clear sky conditions. (National Climactic Data Center 2008).
Average slope (percent) The average slope of the land in the metropolitan area. Coded by author
using GSI software.
Coastal proximity Equal to one over the distance in miles to the nearest coastline. Coded by
author using GSI software.
viiViolent crimes (per capita) These consist of the average of the four z-scores (standard deviations)
for aggravated assaults, robbery, forcible rape, and murder (City and County Data Book
2000).
Property crimes (per capita) These consist of the average of the four z-scores (standard devia-
tions) for aggravated burglary, larceny, motor theft, and arson (City and County Data 2000)
Air quality index (Median) An AQI value is calculated for each pollutant in an area (ground-
level ozone, particle pollution, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide). The
highest AQI value for the individual pollutants is the AQI value for that day. An AQI over
300 is considered hazardous; under 50, good; values in between correspond to moderate,
unhealthy, and very unhealthy (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).
Bars and restaurants Number of establishments classifie as eating and drinking places (NAICS
722) in County Business Patterns 2000.
Arts and Culture Index from Places Rated Almanac (Savageau 1999). Based on a ranking of
cities, it ranges from 100 (New York, NY) to 0 (Houma, LA).
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Main city in MSA/CMSA
Honolulu 876,156 -0.01 0.61 0.203 1 9
Santa Barbara 399,347 0.07 0.66 0.175 2 52
Monterey (Salinas) 401,762 0.10 0.59 0.137 3 135
San Francisco 7,039,362 0.26 0.81 0.137 4 258
San Luis Obispo 246,681 0.02 0.45 0.132 5 60
Santa Fe 147,635 -0.06 0.29 0.128 6 21
Cape Cod (Barnstable) 162,582 0.01 0.40 0.122 7 59
San Diego 2,813,833 0.06 0.48 0.121 8 113
Los Angeles 16,373,645 0.13 0.45 0.081 15 229
Seattle 3,554,760 0.08 0.31 0.060 22 211
Denver 2,581,506 0.05 0.24 0.054 26 193
Portland 2,265,223 0.03 0.17 0.047 37 182
Miami 3,876,380 0.00 0.13 0.041 39 164
Boston 5,819,100 0.12 0.29 0.034 45 254
New York 21,199,865 0.21 0.41 0.028 51 274
Phoenix 3,251,876 0.03 0.08 0.012 72 214
Chicago 9,157,540 0.14 0.22 0.005 81 269
Sioux Falls 172,412 -0.15 -0.26 -0.007 100 72
Washington-Baltimore 7,608,070 0.13 0.15 -0.013 122 270
Cleveland 2,945,831 0.01 -0.03 -0.016 128 232
Minneapolis 2,968,806 0.08 0.02 -0.032 174 268
Atlanta 4,112,198 0.08 0.01 -0.032 175 267
St. Louis 2,603,607 0.00 -0.10 -0.033 179 240
Philadelphia 6,188,463 0.12 0.05 -0.041 195 273
Dallas 5,221,801 0.07 -0.04 -0.045 206 266
Detroit 5,456,428 0.13 0.05 -0.047 217 275
Pittsburgh 2,358,695 -0.04 -0.21 -0.047 218 218
Houston 4,669,571 0.07 -0.11 -0.072 268 272
Census Division
Pacific 45,025,637 0.10 0.39 0.079 1 6
Mountain 18,172,295 -0.06 0.00 0.029 2 1
New England 13,922,517 0.07 0.19 0.027 3 7
South Atlantic 51,769,160 -0.04 -0.08 -0.007 4 4
Middle Atlantic 39,671,861 0.10 0.13 -0.008 5 9
West North Central 19,237,739 -0.11 -0.25 -0.028 6 2
East North Central 45,155,037 0.01 -0.07 -0.029 7 8
West South Central 31,444,850 -0.08 -0.24 -0.040 8 5
East South Central 17,022,810 -0.12 -0.32 -0.041 9 3
MSA Population
MSA, Pop > 5 Million 84,064,274 0.16 0.32 0.027 1 5
MSA, Pop 1.5-4.9 Million 57,157,386 0.03 0.04 -0.001 2 4
MSA, Pop 0.5-1.4 Million 42,435,508 -0.03 -0.09 -0.011 3 3
MSA, Pop < 0.5 Million 42,324,511 -0.10 -0.19 -0.011 4 2
Non-MSA areas 55,440,227 -0.16 -0.32 -0.023 5 1
United States  281,421,906 0.13 0.30 0.051
total
TABLE 1: WAGE, HOUSING-COST, AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE DIFFERENTIALS, 2000
Adjusted Differentials
standard deviations 
Wage and housing price data are taken from the U.S. Census 2000 IPUMS. Wage differentials are based
on the average logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55. Housing-cost differentials
based on the average logarithm of rents and housing prices for units first occupied within the last 10 years.
Adjusted differentials are city-fixed effects from individual level regressions on extended sets of worker
and housing covariates.(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Slope Estimates
Wage differential 2.14 1.59 1.48  
(robust s.e.) (0.20) (0.08) (0.10)  
R-squared 0.74 0.91 0.93  
Panel B: p-value of test that the regression slope equals the mobility-condition slope
Adjusted slope = 1.53 0.002 0.476 0.596
Unadjusted slope = 4.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted 0.20 0.02 -0.02
Unadjusted -0.62 -0.80 -0.83
Panel C: Implied relationship between wages and (residual) quality of life, b Q
Robust errors are shown in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population.
Natural amenities, listed in Table 4 include heating degree days, cooling degree days,
percent of sunshine possible, inverse distance to a coast, and average land slope.
Artificial amenities include bars and restaurants per capita, Places Rated arts and
culture index, median air quality index, and violent and property crime per capita
indices. Each regression is run on 247 observations with non-missing data for all of
these variables.
TABLE 2: REGRESSION OF HOUSING COSTS ON WAGE LEVELS, AND A TEST 









Panel A: Places Rated Almanac "Livability" Index
Raw Score 0.20 -0.29
Revised Score 0.22 -0.33
Number of Metro Areas 274 274
Panel B: PEW Stated-Preference Ranking
"Yes" answers 0.67 0.58 
Absence of "No" answers 0.62 0.60
Number of Metro Areas 28 28
Panel C: Gabriel et al. (2003) State Rankings
Ranking from 1990 0.03 0.74
Ranking from 1980 0.09 0.76
Number of States 50 50
Panel d: Chen and Rosenthal (2008) 2000 Rankings
Metro Areas Only 0.80 0.81
Including Non-Metro Areas 0.78 0.80
Number of Metro Areas 241 241
Number of Non-Metro Areas 49 49
TABLE 3: RANK CORRELATION OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE 





Places rated ranking used for first city in CMSA. Revised Places
Rated Score eliminates cost-of-living and job-market components.
Chen and Rosenthal estimates aggregated from the PMSA to
CMSA level using averages weighted by population. All ranking
correlations are highly significant, with p-values less than 0.01.Type of Amentiy Variables
Dependent Variables Adj QOL Hous. Cost Wages Unadj. QOL Adj QOL Unadj. QOL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8)
Minus 1000s of Heating Degree Days, 65F base 0.0090*** 0.0582*** 0.0199** -0.0053 0.0134*** 0.0076
(mean = 4.37, sd = 2.16) (0.0021) (0.0152) (0.0083) (0.0051) (0.0025) (0.0053)
Minus 1000s of Cooling Degree Days, 65F base 0.0317*** 0.2459*** 0.0959*** -0.0344*** 0.0325*** -0.0066
(mean = 1.29, sd = 0.89) (0.0056) (0.0361) (0.0189) (0.0118) (0.0050) (0.0126)
Sunshine, percent possible 0.2468*** 1.2152*** 0.3002** 0.0036 0.2626*** 0.0303
(mean = 0.0603, sd = 0.078) (0.0426) (0.2786) (0.1490) (0.0924) (0.0413) (0.0688)
Inverse distance to coast 0.5305*** 4.0174*** 1.5426*** -0.5383*** 0.3123*** -0.2475
(mean = 60.3, sd = 7.8) (0.0535) (0.4820) (0.3016) (0.1926) (0.0585) (0.1696)
Average Slope of Land, in percent 0.0089*** 0.0022 -0.0166*** 0.0172*** 0.0086*** 0.0102***
(mean = 1.69, sd = 1.65) (0.0015) (0.0090) (0.0047) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0032)
Restaurants and Bars per Thousand 0.0416*** 0.0805*** 
(mean = 1.71, sd = 0.28) (0.0100) (0.0203)
Log of Places Rated Arts & Culture Index/100 0.0379*** -0.1305*** 
(mean = 0.82, sd = 0.24) (0.0093) (0.0199)
Minus Median Air Quality Index/100 0.0733*** 0.0515
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.0191) (0.0513)
Safety from Violent Crime Index -0.0100 -0.0026
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.0079) (0.0080)
Safety Property Crime Index 0.0051 -0.0019
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.0043) (0.0078)
R-squared 0.70 0.66 0.45 0.28 0.79 0.57
Number of Observations 321 321 321 321 247 247
TABLE 4: HEDONIC ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL AMENITIES
Natural Amenities Only
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions weighted by population. Variables are 
described in the Appendix.
Natural and Artificial 
AmenitiesType of Amentiy Variables
Dependent Quality of Life Variable Adjusted Unadj. Adjusted Unadj. Adjusted Unadj.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
Panel A: Metropolitan Population
Logarithm of Population 0.012*** -0.032*** 0.002 -0.036*** 0.003 -0.041*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of Observations 276 276 274 274 247 247
Panel B: Population Density
Logarithm of Density 0.019*** -0.046*** 0.005** -0.054*** 0.007* -0.041***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of Observations 321 321 321 321 247 247
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The density measure is calculated at 
the census tract level, and averaged according to population.  Regressions weighted by population.
TABLE 5: QUALITY-OF-LIFE, CITY SIZE, AND DENSITY
Natual Amenities 
Controls
Natural and Artificial 
Amenities No ControlsGrowth-
Log Pop Amended
Log Log Growth QOL
Dependent Variables Population Density 1980-2000 Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minus 1000s of Heating Degree Days, 65F base 0.0398 -0.0324 0.0184 0.0152*** 
(mean = 4.37, sd = 2.16) (0.0599) (0.0461) (0.0154) (0.0029)
Minus 1000s of Cooling Degree Days, 65F base 0.1316 -0.0726 -0.0863** 0.0239***
(mean = 1.29, sd = 0.89) (0.1100) (0.1451) (0.0353) (0.0050)
Sunshine, percent possible 0.7976 1.6780** 0.7871** 0.3418***
(mean = 0.0603, sd = 0.078) (0.7338) (0.7537) (0.3081) (0.0597)
Inverse distance to coast 9.4781*** 5.0610*** -0.9095** 0.2196***
(mean = 60.3, sd = 7.8) (2.8825) (1.4963) (0.3621) (0.0730)
Average Slope of Land, in percent -0.0250 0.0127 0.0273* 0.0113***
(mean = 1.69, sd = 1.65) (0.0389) (0.0199) (0.0139) (0.0025)
Restaurants and Bars per Thousand -0.8858*** -0.212 -0.056 0.0355***
(mean = 1.71, sd = 0.28) (0.309) (0.176) (0.075) (0.012)
Log of Places Rated Arts & Culture Index/100 3.7292*** 0.8015*** 0.1814*** 0.0574***
(mean = 0.82, sd = 0.24) (0.228) (0.159) (0.050) (0.011)
Minus Median Air Quality Index/100 -2.1739*** -0.274 0.2117* 0.0945*** 
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.443) (0.343) (0.122) (0.024)
Safety from Violent Crime Index -0.1939* 0.080 0.0493* -0.005
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.114) (0.086) (0.030) (0.010)
Safety Property Crime Index 0.3035** -0.103 -0.030 0.002
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.118) (0.074) (0.029) (0.006)
R-squared 0.84 0.31 0.58 0.74
Number of Observations 247 247 247 247
TABLE 6: ALTERNATE QUALITY-OF-LIFE INDICATORS RELATED TO QUANTITIES AND 
INDIVIDUAL AMENITIES
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions weighted by 
population. The results are in column 4 are based on the QOL measure used in column 6 of Table 4, but 
adding 0.1 times the log population growth, used in column 3 here.College-HS College-HS
Relative QOL Diff
Quanity Wage and 
Dependent Variable Supply Together
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Wage Differential -0.1084*** -0.0990** -0.4394 -0.1398**
(0.0358) (0.0450) (0.4157) (0.0540)
Housing-Cost Differential 0.0262 0.0586** 0.7922*** 0.1321***
(0.0161) (0.0238) (0.1943) (0.0300)
Log Relative Supply of College/HS Workers -0.0073 -0.1000
(0.0071) (imposed)
Minus 1000s of Heating Degree Days, 65F base -0.0073*** -0.0296 -0.0101***
(mean = 4.37, sd = 2.16) (0.0017) (0.0216) (0.0025)
Minus 1000s of Cooling Degree Days, 65F base 0.0019 -0.0504 -0.0028
(mean = 1.29, sd = 0.89) (0.0047) (0.0548) (0.0069)
Sunshine, percent possible 0.0150 -0.4300 -0.0250
(mean = 0.0603, sd = 0.078) (0.0398) (0.2938) (0.0462)
Inverse distance to coast -0.1333** -1.0452** -0.2302***
(mean = 60.3, sd = 7.8) (0.0561) (0.4557) (0.0733)
Average Slope of Land, in percent 0.0000 -0.0200 -0.0020
(mean = 1.69, sd = 1.65) (0.0018) (0.0143) (0.0020)
Restaurants and Bars per Thousand 0.008 0.100 0.0170
(mean = 1.71, sd = 0.28) (0.010) (0.115) (0.0155)
Log of Places Rated Arts & Culture Index/100 -0.007 0.5982*** 0.0484*** 
(mean = 0.82, sd = 0.24) (0.009) (0.084) (0.0114)
Minus Median Air Quality Index/100 0.024 0.5627*** 0.0766*** 
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.017) (0.213) (0.0219)
Safety from Violent Crime Index 0.000 0.001 0.0002
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.004) (0.032) (0.0050)
Safety Property Crime Index -0.0098*** -0.009 -0.0106**
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.003) (0.032) (0.0042)
R-squared 0.10 0.50 0.67 0.65
Number of Observations 325 247 247 247
TABLE 7: RELATIVE WILLINGNESS TO PAY OF COLLEGE VS. HIGH-SCHOOL HEADED 





Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions weighted by 
population. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is 0.51 times the difference between the high-
school premium and college premium for a metro area, measuring the wage sacrifice of college relative to 
high-school workers, using average marginal tax rates and labor income shares. The dependent variable in 
column 3 is a Katz-Murphy (1992)  measure of the supply of college relative to high-school labor. The 
dependent variable in column 4 is the dependent variable in column 2 plus 0.1 times the dependent 
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Relative Quality of Life (Q), No Growth Adjustement 2000
METRO POP >5.0 Million Log-Linear Fit: slope = 1.157 (s.e. 0.302)
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<0.5 Million Non-Metro Areas QOL = 10% of income with Growth Adj.
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Honolulu, HI 876,156 -0.008 0.605 0.203 1 0.159 9  
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 399,347 0.069 0.662 0.175 2 0.097 52  
Salinas (Monterey-Carmel), CA 401,762 0.102 0.590 0.137 3 0.045 135  
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA 7,039,362 0.257 0.813 0.137 4 -0.054 258  
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 246,681 0.020 0.452 0.132 5 0.093 60  
Santa Fe, NM 147,635 -0.063 0.290 0.128 6 0.135 21  
Non-metro, HI 335,381 -0.030 0.332 0.127 . 0.113 .  
Barnstable-Yarmouth (Cape Cod), MA 162,582 0.005 0.395 0.122 7 0.094 59  
San Diego, CA 2,813,833 0.062 0.479 0.121 8 0.058 113  
Grand Junction, CO 116,255 -0.180 0.079 0.114 9 0.199 4  
Non-metro, CO 693,605 -0.137 0.137 0.112 . 0.171 .  
Missoula, MT 95,802 -0.249 -0.090 0.100 10 0.227 1  
Naples, FL 251,377 -0.005 0.286 0.096 11 0.077 82  
Medford-Ashland, OR 181,269 -0.138 0.084 0.095 12 0.159 10  
Eugene-Springfield, OR 322,959 -0.120 0.091 0.089 13 0.143 15  
Corvalis, OR 78,153 -0.113 0.076 0.081 14 0.132 23  
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA 16,373,645 0.131 0.450 0.081 15 -0.018 229  
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 251,494 -0.060 0.150 0.079 16 0.098 51  
Bellingham, WA 166,814 -0.066 0.127 0.074 17 0.098 50  
Non-metro, VT 439,436 -0.198 -0.086 0.074 . 0.176 .  
Wilmington, NC 233,450 -0.134 0.017 0.072 18 0.139 18  
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 589,959 -0.071 0.094 0.066 19 0.095 57  
Burlington, VT 169,391 -0.108 0.021 0.066 20 0.113 35  
Non-metro, CA 1,121,254 -0.051 0.134 0.064 . 0.085 .  
Non-metro, MA 247,672 -0.068 0.108 0.063 . 0.095 .  
Fort Walton Beach, FL 170,498 -0.205 -0.125 0.063 21 0.174 6  
Non-metro, OR 919,033 -0.141 -0.024 0.062 . 0.135 .  
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA 3,554,760 0.080 0.308 0.060 22 -0.003 211  
Non-metro, MT 596,684 -0.265 -0.239 0.059 . 0.206 .  
Asheville, NC 225,965 -0.159 -0.060 0.058 23 0.144 14  
Cheyenne, WY 81,607 -0.249 -0.214 0.058 24 0.195 5  
Colorado Springs, CO 516,929 -0.087 0.033 0.055 25 0.096 55  
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO 2,581,506 0.051 0.240 0.054 26 0.009 193  
Charlottesville, VA 159,576 -0.114 -0.003 0.054 27 0.113 36  
Madison, WI 426,526 -0.039 0.110 0.054 28 0.066 99  
Chico-Paradise, CA 203,171 -0.091 0.043 0.054 29 0.102 46  
Reno, NV 339,486 0.026 0.210 0.053 30 0.027 172  
Portland, ME 243,537 -0.080 0.019 0.052 31 0.085 70  
Tucson, AZ 843,746 -0.113 -0.010 0.052 32 0.111 41  
Punta Gorda, FL 141,627 -0.168 -0.108 0.050 33 0.141 17  
Albuquerque, NM 712,738 -0.083 0.013 0.050 34 0.086 69  
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 440,888 -0.106 -0.014 0.049 35 0.103 45  
Jacksonville, NC 150,355 -0.279 -0.264 0.048 36 0.213 3  
Portland-Salem, OR-WA 2,265,223 0.025 0.174 0.047 37 0.019 182  
Non-metro, NH 496,087 -0.101 -0.030 0.043 . 0.094 .  
Redding, CA 163,256 -0.095 0.001 0.042 38 0.095 56  
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL 3,876,380 0.002 0.126 0.041 39 0.029 164  
Non-metro, RI 61,968 0.061 0.215 0.040 . -0.008 .  
Myrtle Beach, SC 196,629 -0.170 -0.135 0.039 40 0.136 20  
Lawrence, KS 99,962 -0.149 -0.112 0.038 41 0.121 28  
State College, PA 135,758 -0.143 -0.092 0.038 42 0.120 29  
Non-metro, WA 994,967 -0.084 -0.014 0.038 . 0.081 .  
Great Falls, MT 80,357 -0.308 -0.373 0.037 43 0.215 2  
Non-metro, AZ 603,632 -0.180 -0.163 0.035 . 0.139 .  
Iowa City, IA 111,006 -0.088 -0.032 0.035 44 0.080 78  
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT 5,819,100 0.122 0.294 0.034 45 -0.049 254  
Killeen-Temple, TX 312,952 -0.232 -0.249 0.034 46 0.170 7  
Rapid City, SD 88,565 -0.232 -0.266 0.033 47 0.166 8  
Sacramento-Yolo, CA 1,796,857 0.067 0.206 0.033 48 -0.015 222  
Bloomington, IN 120,563 -0.128 -0.090 0.032 49 0.105 44  
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 122,366 -0.146 -0.128 0.030 50 0.114 34  
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 21,199,864 0.210 0.411 0.028 51 -0.107 274  
Non-metro, ME 808,317 -0.202 -0.229 0.027 . 0.144 .  
Bryan-College Station, TX 152,415 -0.138 -0.126 0.027 52 0.107 43  
Panama City, FL 148,217 -0.155 -0.159 0.027 53 0.115 33  
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 1,569,541 -0.109 -0.081 0.027 54 0.089 65  
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 1,333,914 -0.023 0.038 0.026 55 0.033 156  
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 549,033 -0.095 -0.069 0.025 56 0.078 81  
Fayetteville, NC 302,963 -0.190 -0.209 0.024 57 0.138 19  
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TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS BY ESTIMATED QUALITY OF LIFE
Adjusted Unadjusted
Gainesville, FL 217,955 -0.147 -0.156 0.024 58 0.108 42  
Columbia, MO 135,454 -0.180 -0.204 0.023 59 0.129 26  
Anchorage, AK 260,283 0.074 0.185 0.022 60 -0.028 237  
Tallahassee, FL 284,539 -0.111 -0.106 0.022 61 0.084 71  
Lincoln, NE 250,291 -0.134 -0.150 0.022 62 0.097 53  
Daytona Beach, FL 493,175 -0.158 -0.185 0.020 63 0.111 38  
Las Cruces, NM 174,682 -0.207 -0.261 0.020 64 0.141 16  
Provo-Orem, UT 368,536 -0.055 -0.030 0.019 65 0.047 130  
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 1,131,184 0.041 0.115 0.018 66 -0.012 219  
Austin-San Marcos, TX 1,249,763 0.008 0.067 0.017 67 0.009 194  
Athens, GA 153,444 -0.139 -0.153 0.016 68 0.101 47  
Pittsfield, MA 84,699 -0.061 -0.033 0.015 69 0.053 121  
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 1,188,613 0.017 0.073 0.015 70 0.001 204  
Billings, MT 129,352 -0.180 -0.252 0.013 71 0.117 31  
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 3,251,876 0.027 0.075 0.012 72 -0.009 214  
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 319,426 -0.086 -0.100 0.012 73 0.061 107  
Non-metro, ID 786,043 -0.185 -0.251 0.012 . 0.122 .  
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 1,187,941 0.016 0.044 0.011 74 -0.005 212  
Boise City, ID 432,345 -0.083 -0.109 0.010 75 0.056 114  
Non-metro, FL 1,144,881 -0.178 -0.247 0.010 . 0.117 .  
Non-metro, DE 156,638 -0.080 -0.088 0.010 . 0.058 .  
Non-metro, UT 524,673 -0.133 -0.171 0.009 . 0.090 .  
Non-metro, AK 366,649 0.041 0.090 0.009 . -0.018 .  
Spokane, WA 417,939 -0.097 -0.128 0.008 76 0.065 102  
Yuba City, CA 139,149 -0.071 -0.074 0.007 77 0.052 122  
Non-metro, WY 345,642 -0.174 -0.256 0.007 . 0.110 .  
Orlando, FL 1,644,561 -0.040 -0.046 0.006 78 0.029 166  
New London-Norwich, CT-RI 293,566 0.050 0.110 0.006 79 -0.023 235  
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 311,121 -0.140 -0.206 0.005 80 0.088 67  
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI 9,157,540 0.136 0.224 0.005 81 -0.080 269  
New Orleans, LA 1,337,726 -0.070 -0.097 0.005 82 0.045 133  
Springfield, MO 325,721 -0.188 -0.272 0.004 83 0.120 30  
Pensacola, FL 412,153 -0.156 -0.232 0.004 84 0.098 49  
Abilene, TX 126,555 -0.236 -0.349 0.004 85 0.149 12  
Springfield, MA 591,932 -0.007 0.009 0.003 86 0.010 190  
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2,395,997 -0.057 -0.084 0.003 87 0.036 150  
Non-metro, NM 783,991 -0.212 -0.324 0.002 . 0.131 .  
Non-metro, SD 493,867 -0.291 -0.457 0.001 . 0.177 .  
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 476,230 -0.109 -0.171 0.000 88 0.066 100  
Yuma, AZ 160,026 -0.102 -0.158 0.000 89 0.062 104  
Nashville, TN 1,231,311 -0.017 -0.030 -0.001 90 0.009 192  
Stockton-Lodi, CA 563,598 0.088 0.126 -0.002 91 -0.057 259  
Cedar Rapids, IA 191,701 -0.080 -0.137 -0.003 92 0.045 134  
Casper, WY 66,533 -0.226 -0.366 -0.003 93 0.134 22  
Pueblo, CO 141,472 -0.168 -0.269 -0.003 94 0.101 48  
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 207,033 -0.214 -0.342 -0.004 95 0.129 25  
Lafayette, IN 182,821 -0.071 -0.123 -0.006 96 0.040 144  
Fresno, CA 922,516 -0.017 -0.039 -0.006 97 0.007 196  
Goldsboro, NC 113,329 -0.185 -0.297 -0.006 98 0.111 39  
Montgomery, AL 333,055 -0.122 -0.209 -0.006 99 0.070 88  
Sioux Falls, SD 172,412 -0.148 -0.258 -0.007 100 0.083 72  
Non-metro, CT 148,665 0.083 0.119 -0.007 . -0.053 .  
Lewiston-Auburn, ME 90,830 -0.126 -0.229 -0.007 101 0.069 92  
Columbia, SC 536,691 -0.076 -0.145 -0.008 102 0.040 145  
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 341,851 -0.128 -0.220 -0.008 103 0.073 85  
Modesto, CA 446,997 0.055 0.059 -0.008 104 -0.040 251  
Yakima, WA 222,581 -0.028 -0.072 -0.008 105 0.010 187  
Milwaukee-Racine, WI 1,689,572 0.042 0.032 -0.009 106 -0.035 246  
Laredo, TX 193,117 -0.199 -0.332 -0.009 107 0.116 32  
Champaign-Urbana, IL 179,669 -0.082 -0.142 -0.009 108 0.047 131  
Dover, DE 126,697 -0.088 -0.158 -0.009 109 0.048 129  
Jacksonville, FL 1,100,491 -0.050 -0.110 -0.009 110 0.022 179  
Lubbock, TX 242,628 -0.164 -0.282 -0.010 111 0.094 58  
Ocala, FL 258,916 -0.170 -0.298 -0.010 112 0.096 54  
Joplin, MO 157,322 -0.255 -0.417 -0.010 113 0.151 11  
Knoxville, TN 687,249 -0.128 -0.231 -0.011 114 0.070 89  
Non-metro, NV 250,521 0.008 -0.017 -0.011 . -0.012 .  
Lancaster, PA 470,658 -0.015 -0.053 -0.011 115 0.002 203  













TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS BY ESTIMATED QUALITY OF LIFE
Adjusted Unadjusted
Wichita Falls, TX 140,518 -0.228 -0.383 -0.011 117 0.132 24  
Amarillo, TX 217,858 -0.144 -0.253 -0.011 118 0.081 77  
Green Bay, WI 226,778 -0.018 -0.064 -0.011 119 0.002 202  
Savannah, GA 293,000 -0.079 -0.151 -0.012 120 0.041 141  
Merced, CA 210,554 -0.011 -0.048 -0.012 121 -0.001 209  
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV 7,608,070 0.126 0.154 -0.013 122 -0.088 270  
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 1,499,293 0.013 -0.033 -0.013 123 -0.021 233  
Tuscaloosa, AL 164,875 -0.100 -0.195 -0.013 124 0.051 125  
Non-metro, NC 2,612,257 -0.151 -0.268 -0.013 . 0.084 .  
Auburn-Opelika, AL 115,092 -0.133 -0.252 -0.015 125 0.070 87  
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 1,251,509 -0.047 -0.126 -0.015 126 0.015 185  
Mobile, AL 540,258 -0.130 -0.248 -0.015 127 0.068 93  
Cleveland-Akron, OH 2,945,831 0.012 -0.032 -0.016 128 -0.020 232  
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 368,021 -0.033 -0.094 -0.016 129 0.010 189  
Lawton, OK 114,996 -0.259 -0.448 -0.016 130 0.147 13  
Roanoke, VA 235,932 -0.107 -0.212 -0.017 131 0.054 120  
Sheboygan, WI 112,646 -0.062 -0.146 -0.017 132 0.025 176  
Bangor, ME 90,864 -0.170 -0.324 -0.018 133 0.089 64  
Omaha, NE-IA 716,998 -0.080 -0.195 -0.018 134 0.032 158  
Glens Falls, NY 124,345 -0.113 -0.204 -0.019 135 0.062 106  
La Crosse, WI-MN 126,838 -0.128 -0.247 -0.019 136 0.066 98  
Oklahoma City, OK 1,083,346 -0.134 -0.278 -0.020 137 0.064 103  
Non-metro, NE 811,425 -0.262 -0.464 -0.020 . 0.146 .  
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 358,365 -0.047 -0.138 -0.021 138 0.013 186  
Greenville, NC 133,798 -0.081 -0.195 -0.021 139 0.033 155  
Des Moines, IA 456,022 -0.030 -0.123 -0.021 140 0.000 208  
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 483,924 -0.118 -0.254 -0.022 141 0.054 119  
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 128,012 -0.127 -0.271 -0.023 142 0.059 112  
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 637,958 0.003 -0.064 -0.023 143 -0.019 230  
Non-metro, MO 1,800,410 -0.256 -0.456 -0.023 . 0.142 .  
Louisville, KY-IN 1,025,598 -0.041 -0.138 -0.023 144 0.007 197  
Non-metro, MD 385,446 -0.032 -0.105 -0.023 . 0.005 .  
Topeka, KS 169,871 -0.137 -0.286 -0.023 145 0.066 101  
Dubuque, IA 89,143 -0.148 -0.307 -0.024 146 0.072 86  
San Angelo, TX 104,010 -0.179 -0.348 -0.024 147 0.092 61  
Rocky Mount, NC 143,026 -0.110 -0.246 -0.025 148 0.048 128  
Canton-Massillon, OH 406,934 -0.078 -0.191 -0.025 149 0.030 162  
Tyler, TX 174,706 -0.103 -0.234 -0.025 150 0.044 137  
Jonesboro, AR 82,148 -0.241 -0.452 -0.025 151 0.128 27  
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 1,563,282 0.068 0.029 -0.025 152 -0.061 262  
Eau Claire, WI 148,337 -0.118 -0.256 -0.026 153 0.054 118  
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 363,988 -0.132 -0.289 -0.026 154 0.060 111  
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 624,776 -0.105 -0.236 -0.026 155 0.046 132  
Hartford, CT 1,183,110 0.134 0.133 -0.026 156 -0.100 271  
St. Joseph, MO 102,490 -0.165 -0.335 -0.027 157 0.081 76  
Non-metro, IA 1,600,191 -0.192 -0.381 -0.027 . 0.097 .  
Non-metro, WI 1,723,367 -0.117 -0.260 -0.028 . 0.052 .  
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 480,091 -0.180 -0.363 -0.028 158 0.089 63  
Hattiesburg, MS 111,674 -0.179 -0.364 -0.028 159 0.088 66  
Sherman-Denison, TX 110,595 -0.133 -0.291 -0.028 160 0.061 108  
Columbus, OH 1,540,157 0.023 -0.054 -0.028 161 -0.037 247  
Non-metro, AR 1,352,381 -0.237 -0.457 -0.029 . 0.123 .  
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 629,401 -0.010 -0.105 -0.029 162 -0.016 223  
Dayton-Springfield, OH 950,558 -0.021 -0.124 -0.030 163 -0.010 216  
Benton Harbor, MI 162,453 -0.075 -0.194 -0.030 164 0.027 171  
Alexandria, LA 126,337 -0.172 -0.358 -0.030 165 0.083 74  
Baton Rouge, LA 602,894 -0.045 -0.169 -0.030 166 0.003 200  
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 962,441 -0.071 -0.210 -0.030 167 0.018 183  
Williamsport, PA 120,044 -0.126 -0.282 -0.031 168 0.056 116  
Lynchburg, VA 214,911 -0.137 -0.300 -0.031 169 0.062 105  
Enid, OK 57,813 -0.219 -0.435 -0.031 170 0.111 40  
Jackson, MS 440,801 -0.093 -0.246 -0.031 171 0.031 159  
Sharon, PA 120,293 -0.149 -0.319 -0.032 172 0.069 90  
Tulsa, OK 803,235 -0.096 -0.260 -0.032 173 0.031 161  
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 2,968,806 0.083 0.020 -0.032 174 -0.078 268  
Non-metro, VA 1,550,447 -0.158 -0.334 -0.032 . 0.075 .  
Atlanta, GA 4,112,198 0.078 0.014 -0.032 175 -0.074 267  
York, PA 381,751 -0.026 -0.138 -0.033 176 -0.009 215  













TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS BY ESTIMATED QUALITY OF LIFE
Adjusted Unadjusted
Non-metro, SC 1,205,050 -0.135 -0.311 -0.033 . 0.057 .  
Non-metro, OK 1,352,292 -0.257 -0.496 -0.033 . 0.133 .  
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 996,512 0.005 -0.098 -0.033 178 -0.030 239  
St. Louis, MO-IL 2,603,607 0.004 -0.104 -0.033 179 -0.030 240  
Corpus Christi, TX 380,783 -0.099 -0.255 -0.034 180 0.035 152  
Non-metro, KS 1,167,355 -0.241 -0.469 -0.034 . 0.124 .  
Chattanooga, TN-GA 465,161 -0.099 -0.258 -0.034 181 0.034 153  
Erie, PA 280,843 -0.108 -0.268 -0.035 182 0.041 140  
Monroe, LA 147,250 -0.126 -0.307 -0.036 183 0.049 127  
Kansas City, MO-KS 1,776,062 -0.002 -0.129 -0.036 184 -0.030 241  
Sumter, SC 104,646 -0.180 -0.388 -0.037 185 0.083 73  
Non-metro, TN 1,827,139 -0.186 -0.403 -0.037 . 0.086 .  
Springfield, IL 201,437 -0.076 -0.222 -0.038 186 0.020 181  
Non-metro, MI 1,768,978 -0.102 -0.258 -0.038 . 0.037 .  
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN 1,979,202 0.035 -0.070 -0.038 187 -0.052 256  
San Antonio, TX 1,592,383 -0.088 -0.254 -0.039 188 0.024 177  
Indianapolis, IN 1,607,486 0.017 -0.096 -0.039 189 -0.041 252  
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 174,367 -0.169 -0.382 -0.039 190 0.073 84  
Dothan, AL 137,916 -0.183 -0.404 -0.040 191 0.082 75  
Non-metro, ND 358,234 -0.261 -0.532 -0.040 . 0.128 .  
Non-metro, GA 2,519,789 -0.141 -0.330 -0.040 . 0.059 .  
Cumberland, MD-WV 102,008 -0.167 -0.365 -0.040 192 0.076 83  
El Paso, TX 679,622 -0.159 -0.369 -0.040 193 0.067 96  
Rochester, NY 1,098,201 -0.019 -0.136 -0.040 194 -0.015 220  
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD 6,188,463 0.115 0.052 -0.041 195 -0.102 273  
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 875,583 -0.016 -0.132 -0.041 196 -0.017 227  
Florence, AL 142,950 -0.143 -0.348 -0.041 197 0.056 115  
Toledo, OH 618,203 -0.025 -0.164 -0.041 198 -0.016 224  
Owensboro, KY 91,545 -0.136 -0.338 -0.041 199 0.051 124  
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 392,302 -0.116 -0.308 -0.041 200 0.039 146  
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 359,062 -0.078 -0.245 -0.041 201 0.016 184  
Non-metro, WV 1,042,776 -0.206 -0.445 -0.041 . 0.095 .  
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 182,791 -0.049 -0.204 -0.042 202 -0.002 210  
Muncie, IN 118,769 -0.115 -0.304 -0.043 203 0.039 147  
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 1,088,514 0.004 -0.122 -0.044 204 -0.034 245  
Fort Smith, AR-OK 207,290 -0.187 -0.433 -0.044 205 0.079 80  
Non-metro, TX 3,159,940 -0.198 -0.442 -0.045 . 0.087 .  
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 5,221,801 0.065 -0.037 -0.045 206 -0.074 266  
Altoona, PA 129,144 -0.151 -0.363 -0.045 207 0.060 109  
Anniston, AL 112,249 -0.185 -0.424 -0.045 208 0.079 79  
Grand Forks, ND-MN 97,478 -0.204 -0.455 -0.046 209 0.091 62  
Reading, PA 373,638 -0.003 -0.146 -0.046 210 -0.033 244  
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 447,728 0.006 -0.126 -0.046 211 -0.037 248  
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 296,195 -0.095 -0.286 -0.046 212 0.023 178  
Birmingham, AL 921,106 -0.019 -0.179 -0.047 213 -0.026 236  
South Bend, IN 265,559 -0.060 -0.235 -0.047 214 0.001 205  
Waco, TX 213,517 -0.109 -0.311 -0.047 215 0.031 160  
Bismarck, ND 94,719 -0.246 -0.532 -0.047 216 0.113 37  
Non-metro, MN 1,456,119 -0.156 -0.367 -0.047 . 0.065 .  
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI 5,456,428 0.130 0.053 -0.047 217 -0.117 275  
Pittsburgh, PA 2,358,695 -0.041 -0.207 -0.047 218 -0.011 218  
Mansfield, OH 175,818 -0.100 -0.294 -0.048 219 0.026 174  
Wichita, KS 545,220 -0.064 -0.257 -0.048 220 0.000 207  
St. Cloud, MN 167,392 -0.099 -0.290 -0.049 221 0.027 170  
Florence, SC 125,761 -0.121 -0.341 -0.049 222 0.036 151  
Wausau, WI 125,834 -0.074 -0.265 -0.049 223 0.008 195  
Non-metro, IN 1,690,582 -0.101 -0.306 -0.050 . 0.025 .  
Non-metro, NY 1,503,399 -0.115 -0.304 -0.050 . 0.039 .  
Non-metro, IL 1,877,585 -0.148 -0.369 -0.050 . 0.056 .  
Janesville-Beloit, WI 152,307 -0.002 -0.164 -0.050 224 -0.039 249  
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 191,822 0.030 -0.117 -0.051 225 -0.059 261  
Charleston, WV 251,662 -0.104 -0.331 -0.052 226 0.021 180  
Youngstown-Warren, OH 594,746 -0.079 -0.276 -0.052 227 0.010 191  
Non-metro, OH 2,139,364 -0.099 -0.306 -0.052 . 0.023 .  
Pine Bluff, AR 84,278 -0.159 -0.416 -0.052 228 0.055 117  
Houma, LA 194,477 -0.111 -0.338 -0.053 229 0.027 173  
Non-metro, PA 1,889,525 -0.134 -0.364 -0.054 . 0.042 .  
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 1,170,111 -0.028 -0.190 -0.054 230 -0.019 231  
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Binghamton, NY 252,320 -0.112 -0.313 -0.054 232 0.034 154  
Huntsville, AL 342,376 -0.044 -0.244 -0.055 233 -0.017 225  
Columbus, GA-AL 274,624 -0.139 -0.379 -0.056 234 0.045 136  
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 452,851 -0.021 -0.196 -0.056 235 -0.028 238  
Non-metro, LA 1,098,766 -0.170 -0.435 -0.056 . 0.061 .  
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 335,227 -0.213 -0.502 -0.056 236 0.087 68  
Elmira, NY 91,070 -0.130 -0.345 -0.057 237 0.044 138  
Non-metro, KY 2,068,667 -0.183 -0.456 -0.057 . 0.069 .  
Lafayette, LA 385,647 -0.116 -0.356 -0.057 238 0.027 169  
Danville, VA 110,156 -0.153 -0.403 -0.057 239 0.052 123  
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 477,441 -0.077 -0.294 -0.057 240 0.004 199  
Wheeling, WV-OH 153,172 -0.179 -0.448 -0.057 241 0.067 95  
Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 132,008 -0.180 -0.448 -0.057 242 0.068 94  
Longview-Marshall, TX 208,780 -0.135 -0.386 -0.058 243 0.038 148  
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 1,135,614 0.008 -0.178 -0.059 244 -0.052 257  
Terre Haute, IN 149,192 -0.125 -0.372 -0.060 245 0.032 157  
Sioux City, IA-NE 124,130 -0.145 -0.417 -0.060 246 0.041 142  
Pocatello, ID 75,565 -0.125 -0.396 -0.062 247 0.025 175  
Peoria-Pekin, IL 347,387 -0.021 -0.217 -0.062 248 -0.033 243  
Odessa-Midland, TX 237,132 -0.123 -0.382 -0.062 249 0.027 168  
Fort Wayne, IN 502,141 -0.049 -0.268 -0.062 250 -0.018 228  
Utica-Rome, NY 299,896 -0.115 -0.342 -0.062 251 0.030 163  
Jackson, TN 107,377 -0.081 -0.322 -0.063 252 0.000 206  
Bloomington-Normal, IL 150,433 0.026 -0.149 -0.063 253 -0.063 265  
Rochester, MN 124,277 0.022 -0.164 -0.063 254 -0.063 264  
Albany, GA 120,822 -0.082 -0.316 -0.063 255 0.003 201  
Lima, OH 155,084 -0.084 -0.322 -0.064 256 0.004 198  
Lake Charles, LA 183,577 -0.066 -0.303 -0.064 257 -0.010 217  
Johnstown, PA 232,621 -0.186 -0.476 -0.064 258 0.067 97  
Jackson, MI 158,422 -0.014 -0.212 -0.065 259 -0.039 250  
Non-metro, MS 1,820,996 -0.203 -0.517 -0.065 . 0.074 .  
Non-metro, AL 1,338,141 -0.175 -0.477 -0.067 . 0.056 .  
Syracuse, NY 732,117 -0.040 -0.251 -0.068 260 -0.023 234  
Macon, GA 322,549 -0.060 -0.299 -0.068 261 -0.015 221  
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 129,749 -0.185 -0.498 -0.068 262 0.060 110  
Rockford, IL 371,236 -0.003 -0.211 -0.068 263 -0.049 255  
Gadsden, AL 103,459 -0.134 -0.421 -0.069 264 0.029 165  
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 243,815 -0.099 -0.356 -0.069 265 0.010 188  
Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 151,237 -0.155 -0.457 -0.071 266 0.040 143  
Decatur, AL 145,867 -0.064 -0.326 -0.072 267 -0.017 226  
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX 4,669,571 0.073 -0.111 -0.072 268 -0.100 272  
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 315,538 -0.162 -0.477 -0.073 269 0.043 139  
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 403,070 -0.011 -0.239 -0.074 270 -0.048 253  
Victoria, TX 84,088 -0.081 -0.356 -0.075 271 -0.008 213  
Jamestown, NY 139,750 -0.145 -0.430 -0.077 272 0.038 149  
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 569,463 -0.212 -0.570 -0.079 273 0.069 91  
Decatur, IL 114,706 -0.054 -0.349 -0.088 274 -0.033 242  
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 385,090 -0.036 -0.390 -0.108 275 -0.062 263  















 Hawaii 1,211,537 -0.014 0.530 0.182 1 0.146 4 21 38  
 California 33,871,648 0.126 0.458 0.085 2 -0.012 37 39 42  
 Vermont 608,827 -0.173 -0.056 0.071 3 0.159 2 13 13  
 Colorado 4,301,261 -0.016 0.172 0.065 4 0.059 17 45 34  
 Oregon 3,421,399 -0.045 0.106 0.058 5 0.072 13 24 22  
 Montana 902,195 -0.255 -0.237 0.055 6 0.196 1 5 4  
 Washington 5,894,121 0.027 0.181 0.046 7 0.019 29 33 41  
 New  Hampshire 1,235,786 0.033 0.164 0.037 8 0.008 32 20 43  
 Massachusetts 6,349,097 0.094 0.251 0.034 9 -0.031 42 29 27  
 New  Mexico 1,819,046 -0.149 -0.136 0.033 10 0.115 7 7 14  
 Maine 1,274,923 -0.160 -0.171 0.027 11 0.117 6 9 9  
 Utah 2,233,169 -0.054 -0.023 0.021 12 0.049 21 36 39  
 Arizona 5,130,632 -0.027 0.019 0.020 13 0.032 28 34 20  
 Florida 15,982,378 -0.060 -0.036 0.020 14 0.052 19 19 10  
 Rhode  Island 1,048,319 0.020 0.082 0.016 15 0.000 33 14 12  
 Alaska 626,932 0.055 0.130 0.014 16 -0.022 39 41 23  
 Wyoming 493,782 -0.193 -0.264 0.014 17 0.127 5 2 1  
 New  Jersey 8,414,350 0.190 0.336 0.012 18 -0.106 50 46 47  
 Idaho 1,293,953 -0.147 -0.212 0.007 19 0.094 10 4 5  
 Connecticut 3,405,565 0.165 0.278 0.005 20 -0.096 49 32 32  
 New  York 18,976,457 0.120 0.199 0.003 22 -0.070 47 50 50  
 South  Dakota 754,844 -0.252 -0.389 0.003 21 0.154 3 1 2  
 North  Carolina 8,049,313 -0.084 -0.141 -0.003 23 0.049 20 18 17  
 Nevada 1,998,257 0.054 0.054 -0.010 25 -0.040 43 11 29  
 Virginia 7,078,515 -0.034 -0.085 -0.010 24 0.013 30 30 31  
 Illinois 12,419,293 0.065 0.063 -0.013 26 -0.049 45 48 48  
 Nebraska 1,711,263 -0.175 -0.319 -0.014 27 0.095 9 8 16  
 Wisconsin 5,363,675 -0.036 -0.099 -0.014 28 0.011 31 40 37  
  District of Columbia 572,059 0.126 0.154 -0.015 -0.088  
 Maryland 5,296,486 0.110 0.126 -0.016 29 -0.079 48 47 45  
 South  Carolina 4,012,012 -0.100 -0.214 -0.018 30 0.047 22 25 18  
 Arkansas 2,673,400 -0.185 -0.364 -0.023 31 0.094 11 6 3  
 Iowa 2,926,324 -0.140 -0.293 -0.023 32 0.067 14 10 15  
 Delaware 783,600 0.043 -0.010 -0.026 33 -0.046 44 35 30  
 Missouri 5,595,211 -0.107 -0.247 -0.026 34 0.045 23 43 40  
 Oklahoma 3,450,654 -0.179 -0.369 -0.028 35 0.087 12 22 21  
 Tennessee 5,689,283 -0.102 -0.249 -0.029 36 0.040 24 31 28  
 Louisiana 4,468,976 -0.105 -0.264 -0.032 37 0.040 26 17 8  
 Kansas 2,688,418 -0.133 -0.312 -0.034 38 0.055 18 12 19  
 Ohio 11,353,140 -0.024 -0.143 -0.035 39 -0.011 36 38 33  
 Georgia 8,186,453 -0.022 -0.145 -0.036 40 -0.015 38 28 36  
 Indiana 6,080,485 -0.032 -0.168 -0.039 41 -0.010 35 44 44  
 Pennsylvania 12,281,054 -0.011 -0.135 -0.039 42 -0.023 40 37 35  
 Minnesota 4,919,479 -0.008 -0.134 -0.040 43 -0.025 41 42 46  
 North  Dakota 642,200 -0.235 -0.495 -0.040 44 0.112 8 15 6  
 Kentucky 4,041,769 -0.121 -0.326 -0.044 45 0.040 25 23 24  
 Alabama 4,447,100 -0.114 -0.318 -0.045 47 0.034 27 26 26  
 West  Virginia 1,808,344 -0.162 -0.392 -0.045 46 0.064 15 16 11  
 Texas 20,851,820 -0.041 -0.203 -0.046 48 -0.010 34 27 25  
 Michigan 9,938,444 0.051 -0.061 -0.047 49 -0.066 46 49 49  
 Mississippi 2,844,658 -0.168 -0.427 -0.053 50 0.061 16 3 7  
TABLE A2: LIST OF STATES BY ESTIMATED QUALITY OF LIFE



































































































































































































-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Log Differential of High School Wage
METRO POP >5.0 Million Weighted Fit: slope = 1.047 (s.e. 0.043) 
1.5-5.0 Million 0.5-1.5 Million Diagonal line
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-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Log-Rent Differential
METRO POP >5.0 Million Diagonal
1.5-5.0 Million 0.5-1.5 Million Linear Fit: Slope = 1.117 (.053)
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Log Wage Differential
LINEAR Q = -.1
Q = 0 Q = .1
QUADRATIC Q = -.1
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Non-Metro Areas of State
Linear Fit:
slope =  0.47 ( 0.23)
Figure A4: Compositional Wage and Housing Costs across Areas: 2000 